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European Community. 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY now in its  13th year of publication celebrates 
the  lOth  anniversary  of  the  signing  of  the  Rome Treaties creating the 
Common Market and Euratom. By  happy coincidence, this  year marks 
the 20th birthday of George C.  Marshall's proposal on June 5,  194  7,  at 
Harvard University. William Diebold bows to this felicitous juxtaposition 
of anniversaries. It is  by  accident that they come together this year; but 
it is  no  accident that they  are  20th century  events  related  not only  by 
causality but by  singular greatness of vision. 
General Marshall's unrhetorical words of 194  7 contained the observa-
tion  that " ... a  (U.S.)  program designed  to place  Europe on  its  feet 
economically ... is  the business  of the Europeans.  The initiative ... 
must come from Europe."  The European  initiative  came,  as  Theodore 
Geiger recalls by  way  of the OEEC. Thus the process began. The con-
cept of unity in Europe, recounted by  Paul Hoffman, already was in the 
minds of certain European and American statesmen. Jean Monnet's vision 
of Europe has remained steadfastly clear; Europe is a"process"-organic, 
growing, and changing but moving always toward unity-creating a new 
entity which as Walter Hal/stein predicts, will introduce a vital new dimen-
sion to the world's political scene. 
The testaments of Pierre Chatenet and Dino Del Bo stress the step-by-
step pragmatic quality of the unification process-that there are lessons 
and  experiences learned,  but that behind the  arduous  day-to-day  work 
remains the vision.  Etienne Hirsch  observes  how  short  a  decade  is  in 
history's perspective when  the foundation of a new  political structure is 
in the building. 
The  building  process  itself  is  fraught  with  dangers  and  Emanuele 
Gazzo braves a look into the future to focus upon unpleasant as  well as 
hopeful prospects.  Boyd France  steps  back to  assess  the multi-faceted 
aspects of technology in a Europe being put together stone-by-stone but 
racing to keep pace with industrial giants to the East and West. Viewing 
the predicament of a proud non-giant, Roy Pryce sees in the situation of 
the United Kingdom vis-a-vis the Common Market a constant reappraisal 
of Britain's future,  a  painful  rediscovery  of  Europe,  and  the  ultimate 
realization that there are no alternatives. Andrew Shonfield looks at the 
subtle impact of the Treaty of Rome, he wonders if its effect upon inter-
national relations has not been more profound than realized. Elena Bubba 
asks som~ hard questions about the future of Europe unless moves toward 
democratizing European institutions  such  as  the  European Parliament 
are made. Finally Kaye Whiteman looks abroad to the developing coun-
tries to measure the scope and examine the effect of the Common Market's 
own "Marshall Plan" in Africa. 
This issue  of  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  contains not only  tributes  but 
reviews, evaluations and criticism of the contemporary European integra-
tion scene.  The tributes may  be  due,  but constant review, criticism,  and 
evaluation of progress toward European unity are essential for its process. 
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''The Common Market Is a Process'' 
TEN YEARS have now passed since the Rome Treaties were signed. Sixteen years have 
passed since the same countries-Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands-signed  the  Paris  Treaty setting  up  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community. So, for sixteen years, Europe has been striving towards unity. 
By July next year, the bulk of the economic barriers between these six countries will 
have been removed. They will form one vast market of 183  million people pursuing 
common economic policies, working out and applying common rules through common 
institutions. Great Britain stands on the threshold, a living proof of the great progress 
that has been made. 
Americans should understand better than anyone the benefits for  Europe and the 
world of the peaceful revolution that is  taking place in Europe, for America too is  a 
common market whose states apply common laws through their common federal insti-
tutions. 
The Common Market is a process, not a product. Europe is on the way to achieving 
economic unity, but we  must have no doubt that in due course it will  move towards 
unity in foreign policy and defense. What is gradually emerging is a great new entity-
the United States of Europe. 
Jean Monnet  3 4 
Robert Schuman, proponent of the  European  coal  and  steel  plan, 
holds the Paris Treaty creating the first European Community, signed 
in  Paris on Apri/18, 1951. Among the  signers were  (left  to  right): 
Joseph  Bech  representing Luxembourg; Joseph  Mew·ice,  Belgium; 
Count Carlo Sforza, Italy; Konrad Adenauer, the Fedeml  Republic 
of Germany; and Dirk Stikker, the Netherlands. 
On March 25,  1967 Europe celebrates the tenth  anniversar~ 
of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the birthday of the Euro 
pean Economic Community. In these ten years the landscap< 
of world politics has changed sufficiently to  ask whether tht 
aims and methods written into the treaties of economic inte 
gration still hold good. The answer can only be an unqualifiec 
"yes." Only a securely knit and independent Europe made pos 
sible by the Community can assume responsibility and maintair 
its individual character. 
It  was the intention of those who created the European Eco 
nomic Community that it be the core and vanguard of an all 
European community. Wherever freedom and human rights an 
cherished in the West and in the East, the peoples of Europe an 
summoned to collaborate in the task of unification. The Com 
munity embodies no Europe of fear-for it is not an instrumen 
of the cold war-but  Europe of growing unity.lt is not a Europ<: 
of poverty, but the Europe of economic and social progress. 
The Community is  going along the road indicated by  th<: 
Treaty of Rome. Economic integration is not yet complete. Tht: 
aim is  to build a common market of continental scale and tc 
merge the economies of the six  Community countries in om 
great European economy.  However,  important progress  ha~ 
been made on both counts. Most impressive are decisions on tht: 
establishment of the customs union and the common agricul 
tural policy by  July  1,  1968. Economic union merely by  it~ 
existence gives its members the opportunity to reach agreemen 
more easily in other areas of political union such as  non-eco 
nomic foreign policy and defense policy. This occurs even when 
vital national interests are at stake; it is  possible because of ' 
Community constitution to find balanced solutions for Europt 
and in the long run this is  to the advantage of all concerned 
The unification  of  Europe is  directed  neither  against  th1 
Soviet Union nor against the United States, but it is in the inter 
ests of both. The establishment of a Community order in Europ1 
may accomplish what cannot be achieved by a bipolar systen 
of world power or by a Balkanized Europe. It may rid Europ1 
of  the  dangers  inherent  in  national  frontiers  and  eliminatt 
Europe's storm center from which two world wars have come 
This would provide a solid foundation for cooperation with th< 
rest  of  the  world  on  a  basis  of  mutual  trust  or  genuint 
partnership. 
In the forward-looking policy of President Kennedy, "Atlan 
tic partnership" between Europe and the U.S. depended on th<: 
completion of European unity.  President Johnson has recon 
firmed this policy. Only when it is united will Europe be stron! 
enough to assume the rights and obligations of an equal partne1 
and so determine its own destiny. The Kennedy Round is a firs1 
example of this policy in practice. With these negotiations th<: 
economic dialogue of the Continents has  been opened.  Thi~ 
event was made possible by the existence of the European Eco 
nomic Community. Many fields  of common interest are stil 
awaiting a partnership policy.  This goal  we  shall pursue un 
swervingly. 
Walter Hollstein, President, EEC Commission The Community is ten years old. Ten years is a long time in the 
life of a young institution, but a short time in the life and history 
of nations. It is  a long time for men whose efforts give life to 
these institutions, but a short time for all their accomplishments. 
Ten years is a long time to hope patiently, but a short time to 
surmount the difficulties that had to be overcome. 
Anniversaries should not be merely an occasion to look back. 
Coinciding with an essential stage in the development of Com-
munity institutions, this anniversary, by reinforcing their unity, 
should be above all a starting point in a new stage for expanding 
horizons and perfecting methods for .the Europe of tomorrow. 
The stakes are decisive. The Community is already showing 
both the awareness of our Continent's shortcomings in the cru-
cial sectors of the modern economy, and the will to correct them 
now. Europe's place and role in the world depends on it. 
Ten years ago we  undertook joint activities in the nuclear 
sector. Today we  have teams of highly qualified Community 
scientists, equipment, and knowledge gained from experience 
which are part of the Community's patrimony. 
We must continue with these activities and reinforce them, 
adapting our instruments and methods for use in the present 
situation. Then, taking into account this unique experience, de-
fine the ways and means of making progress in other advanced 
technological sectors. 
Euratom's experience provides lessons for  the Community 
we hope will soon be realized. 
Pierre Chatenet, President, Euratom Commission 
The European Coal and Steel Community, the very first pillar 
of European economic integration, is  delighted to participate 
in the tenth anniversary celebration of the Rome Treaties. 
Some urgent tasks still face the Six if they wish to meet peace-
ful  international competition and to fulfill  the domestic need 
for a modern economy and society. Specifically, they must make 
every effort to achieve their role as  a world presence. This is 
more a duty than a  right,  imposed by  their past history  and 
present wealth of cultural and human values.  Their decisions 
to persevere derive not from dreams, but from achievements. 
The past ten years have proven the worth of the Coal and 
Steel Community Treaty, even though it covers only a small part 
of the economy. By exercising its supranational powers to the 
utmost, the ECSC has achieved results which have benefited 
the six member countries' economies. It has turned a product 
and an energy source traditionally valued only for its strategic 
importance into one of the most important and decisive factors 
for peace. 
The ECSC will soon combine its experience with the other 
two  Communities.  I  hope this  contribution of experience  in 
a small but essential area of the European economy will assist 
the continuous development of the Community. 
Dina Del Bo, President, ECSC High Authority  5 6 
What the Future Holds for Europe 
by EMANUELE  GAZZO 
THE  SIX  COUNTRIES  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY,  in  fifteen 
more months, will  trade all  kinds of goods freely.  This means 
a single market will stretch from the very tip of Sicily, almost 
within sight of the African coast, right up to the beaches of the 
North Sea, within sight of the Scandinavian peninsula. A single 
customs border will  encircle  this  market,  in  which  the  same 
rules will apply in several sectors. There will be a real and almost 
perfect customs union for all kinds of industrial and agricultural 
products, for all raw materials and finished products. 
Right now, industrial products already move freely between 
seven  other European countries,  including  Great Britain.  But 
each of these countries has kept its own tariffs towards the out-
side  world and they have not liberalized trade in  agricultural 
products. Their arrangement, a free trade area, could continue 
as  is.  But there is  a basic difference between these two  groups 
of countries. For the Community of the Six,  planned and ori-
ented towards the future, the future is  more important than its 
past.  The Free Trade Area of the Seven,  while  a  noteworthy 
achievement and one that should be  preserved, has no future 
of its own. So, the future really ought to be explored to find out 
whether the Community will make progress, in the right direc-
tion, and how fast. 
To evaluate its future correctly, the basic purpose of the Six 
must be  kept in  mind:  to  achieve  a  union  of people-a full 
union-first economic and social, then political. The creation of 
a new unity, then, is  the goal of the Community, the creation 
of something like,  but not  exactly  like,  the  United  States  of 
America, something that has  to  be  quite European. Once this 
goal is  understood, the means for achieving it  can be readied. 
To  understand  it,  we  must  begin  with  the  things  that  have 
already happened, especially in  the last few  years.  During the 
Sixties, we  notice,  it  has  been  relatively  easy  to  modify  and 
adapt the European social and economic structures to the new 
size,  the new  unity, but it  has  been very difficult,  and still  is, 
to modify and adapt the administrative and political organiza-
tions  of the States and national Administrations.  As  a  result, 
crises and serious setbacks have arisen. 
Crises  Increasingly Belong to Community Life 
Difficulties of this sort have become more and more a part of 
Community life in the four years since January 1963. This first 
observation leads to the first forecast. We will often meet simi-
lar, probably more serious, difficulties in our path in the future. 
In the past, trouble has come from three sources. "Objective" 
difficulties have arisen because of the increasingly strong impact 
of unity on decisions usually reserved for sovereign states "Sub-
jective"  difficulties  have  arisen  from the  refusal  by  one  gov-
ernment  (not always  the  same)  to  accept  and  apply  certain 
common rules and from its desire to prevent the "federal" power 
written  into  the  Treaties  of Paris  and  Rome  from  evolving. 
Without this power or without hope that it will exist some day, 
there can be  no "United States," and the  irreversibility  of the 
European-Community process would prove a myth. The third 
type of difficulty depends on "outside factors." As Europe grad-
ually moves  towards unity,  touching more and more political 
fields,  the  world  political  context cannot be  abstracted.  Each 
European state is  more or less  involved in different aspects of 
world politics,  but united, they would have direct interests in 
every aspect of world, and even extra-terrestrial politics. 
All of these troubles only confirm that establishing the Euro-
pean Community, too  often called "the Common Market," is 
a profoundly innovating act of political creation. This explains 
why it is so difficult. The crises, jolts, and struggles are the price 
for  unification,  which  is  often  the  fruit  of a  civil  war.  The 
successive  clashes of power inside  the  Community are a kind 
of civil war which will strengthen unity (or make it impossible 
once and for all). As in  real civil wars, people are fighting for 
institutions, for legal  equality, for  a  new  political order, even 
if the apparent cause of conflict is  the price of wheat or taxes 
on tea. 
"Imbalances" Impel Progress 
So  far,  the "successive  disequilibria,"  method  so  dear  to  the 
European founding fathers, has pushed the Community along. 
This method consists of making progress in one area, then find-
ing that only  progress in  another area can adjust the  "imbal-
ance" caused by  the first.  Another "imbalance" occurs,  to  be 
adusted in turn. This chain reaction keeps the work of construc-
tion moving and forces the reticent to participate in it. With the 
elimination of customs duties, for example, tax borders become 
a source of imbalance, which harmonization must adjust. Later, 
the harmonization of indirect taxes and the free circulation of 
capital will make it urgent to harmonize direct taxes, and so on. 
Can this method be  used  in  the  future? Forecasts hinge  on 
the answer to  this question. Conceivably,  it could.  In general, 
and barring the intervention of a catastrophe from outside, the 
Community will  probably continue to develop. Even if current 
polycentric  tendencies  continue  to  strengthen  the  ascendancy 
of the State and weaken Community institutions, they could not 
prevent this kind of progress. 
In  the  next few  years,  indirect  taxes  will  probably be  har-
monized, and later, great progress will  be made in harmonizing 
direct taxes. With the removal of legislative and fiscal barriers, 
"trans-national" companies will be formed in Europe, and will 
benefit from the first  policy for scientific research, initiated by 
the Governments and the Commission. 
Probably towards the end of April, the final hours of negotia-
tion  will  resolve  the  most  difficult  problems  in  the  Kennedy 
Round,  such  as  American  Selling  Price  and  disparities.  The 
psychological impact of even 18-20 per cent average reductions 
of the  current tariff  levels  will  help  the  Community to  make 
progress  in  establishing  its  common commercial  policy,  pro-
gress  all  the more necessary  if economic growth  slows  at the 
end of the war in Vietnam. 
However, it is precisely the political factors outside the Com-
munity  organization  that could  change  the  course  of events, 
for better or worse. If  the French Government's attitude towards 
the Community's practical achievements remains positive,  the 
merger of the three Executives can be expected before the end 
of 1967. The merger as  a factor for  detente  and change will 
allow the re-thinking of other problems. 
Detente and Dynamism by Merging Treaties 
About the middle of 1968, the member states,  in cooperation 
with the single Commission, could begin discussions for a single 
treaty which  will  take  at least  three years.  Greater flexibility 
on the part of the French and realism on the part of the others 
would allow more rapid drafting of the new treaty. Emanuele Gazzo,  Editor-in-chief of Agence 
Europe,  the  daily  and  most  complete  report 
on  the  European  Community,  founded  the 
news  service  in  1953.  From  1935-40,  Dr. 
Gazzo published the Italian historical and lit-
erary review Emiliano degli Orfini. A member 
of  the  Resistance  during  the  war,  a  poet, 
historian, and critic, he  entered journalism in 
1945, drawing upon his early training in eco-
nomic~. From 1949-53, Dr. Gazzo was editor 
with  "ANSA,"  the  Italian  national  news 
bureau. 
The new treaty could be placed in the context of an economic 
lnion as  part of a gradual political union and, compared with 
:he  present  treaties,  be  considerably  simplified.  The  Council 
:ould act as  a  European Senate,  deciding  all  questions  in  its 
:ompetence by qualified majority. The Commission, deliberat-
:ng with the Council, would then be an economic super-govern-
ment, receiving general political guidance from a purely politi-
:al body which,  although  unifying more slowly,  would  begin 
to  decide some less-controversial aspects of a European foreign 
Jolicy. 
The  economy,  highly  integrated,  would  benefit  from  the 
mtonomy of decision and execution permitted by an independ-
~nt budget and  resources,  although  under the  control  of the 
member States. The European economic organization could take 
1  quasi-definitive  shape during the  1970's. Its primary objec-
:ives  would be  a monetary and economic union, an industrial 
md technological development policy, Europe-wide production 
?Ianning (including agriculture), fiscal and legislative harmoni-
~ation, and the achievement of one or several European satellite 
telecommunication networks. 
rhe Community's Future as a World Power 
But all that will have to await a change in the size of the Euro-
Jean Community. 
Great Britain, after more soundings and informal talks, may 
:ormally  seek  admission.  Negotiations  could  conclude  at the 
md of 1967 or the beginning of 1968 with Britain's adhesion 
becoming effective on January 1, 1969. If  Britain joins, perhaps 
:ertain  other  countries,  such  as  Denmark,  now  prepared  to 
~nter would  join  at the same time,  and the years  1968-1969 
would be occupied with negotiating trade and association agree-
ments to remove every  dange~.of a European "commercial war." 
Other European countries would join the  Community only 
later, after completely accepting the treaty for political union. 
After a period of transition to a confederation, the Community 
would become a federation in the middle of the next decade. 
[ts  currency would become a  reserve currency with the  same 
>tanding as the dollar, and from that moment on, the price of 
gold would lose all importance. Politically united, Europe could 
then comment on every great world political question. 
The most important foreseeable change, in relations with the 
United  States  and the  SQviet  bloc,  will  be  brought about  by 
forces  outside  the  Community.  First,  the  Soviet  Union will 
recognize the Common Market as an economic entity. Second, 
~ither the war in Vietnam will  end or the need  will  arise  for 
Europe, the United States, and the rest of the world to establish 
11ew  machinery to  avoid  grave  economic and political crises. 
Third, the reform of NATO will  be  completed between  1969 
md 1970. 
Europe's assumption of greater responsibility for the Conti-
llent  would  enable  a  real  and  balanced  partnership with  the 
United States to be formed which would provide the framework 
for finding new solutions to mutual problems without upsetting 
Europe's new-found equilibrium. Starting with Euro-American 
representative bodies, the creation of Atlantic institutions could 
be  started towards the end of the Si~ties. They would prepare 
1eeded solutions for problems as difficult as reform of the inter-
1ational  monetary  system,  world  agricultural  planning,  and 
Jolicy towards the rest of the world. 
Stronger Centrifugal Forces Would Kill  Hope 
However, events inside or outside the Community, more acute 
polycentrism, some governments' stubbornness, or all  of these 
factors  together  may  strengthen  the  centrifugal  forces,  allow 
only token economic progress,  slow  the  Community's normal 
development by formulas such as "synchronization," and "par-
allelism," and call the institutions and rules of the Treaty into 
question again.  In this case,  the Community would be vulner-
able to economic recession. Each Government would take back 
the powers it had relinquished. At best, the Community would 
mark time in  the coming years, without drawing any closer to 
its real goal. 
England could be induced to give up  its  candidacy. As some 
of the Six tried to solve their own trade problems with policies 
outside Community institutions, political crises would multiply. 
It  would become impossible to merge the Communities. Serious 
and bitter disputes would arise, especially when it came time to 
re-examine  agricultural  prices  and  financing  for  the  common 
agricultural policy. 
Then, the notion of "irreversibility" would be revealed as an 
illusion. It  would apply only to a part of what had been achieved, 
the part each considered most useful  to  himself.  E~ch country 
would apply its  own policy  in  every  conceivable sector. Hope 
would have to be given up for a Europe, a world presence with 
its  own  ideas  and one voice,  behaving not like  a  new  power 
center, but like a model and magnet for civilization. 
Ten years is quite a long time for one who is 
impatient to get results. For him, if much has been 
achieved in the way of economic integration, if trade 
barriers inside the Common Market are disappearing at 
a pace faster than was envisaged, the obstacles on the 
way towards political unity still appear formidable. 
But he can be comforted by the fact that governments 
will not be able to resist the tide as ideals of a 
united Europe are shared by a majority of the interested 
people, including now the British. 
A decade is a short period for the historian. This 
decade will remain as a turning point. For the first 
time in history, nations which had just ended fighting 
against each other the most cruel war, agreed to reconcile 
and started building up, between equals, a new relation-
ship. The European Community is the firm foundation on 
which to erect the United States of Europe which will 
allow nations, impotent as long as they remain divided, 
to speak and to cooperate on equal terms with the 
largest countries, and to contribute to the institution 
of a world order committed to ensure peace, freedom, 
justice and prosperity to all.  , 
ETIENNE HIRSCH 
Former President, Euratom Commission 
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The Rome Treaty as an Instrument 
of International Relations 
by AN DREW SHONFIELD 
BECAUSE OF THE ROME TREATY'S STRONG EMPHASIS on removing 
barriers to competition some observers concluded, at its signing, 
that the aim of the whole exercise was to organize a mass Euro-
pean return to the principles of laissez-faire. 
Particularly in  Britain, it was a commonly held view of the 
Left  that the EEC was  essentially  an instrument of old-style 
capitalism-that under the guise of removing the barriers.which 
states had erected to the free movement of goods, money and 
persons in Western Europe, it was really bent on a much bigger 
bid:  to take the state out of the business of economic manage-
ment  altogether.  As  foreseen,  strong  modern  governments, 
whose  skill  and  power  in  economic  management  had  been 
greatly enhanced by the wartime and post-war experience, were 
to be first constricted and then enfeebled by the Rome Treaty, 
while at the center of the Community a  new  agency with  an 
authority far weaker than  the  typical  West  European  state's 
would try to establish itself as  a kind of surrogate. 
The facts lent some plausibility to this interpretation, at least 
in  the initial phase of the  Treaty.  In the  late  1950's and  the 
early 1960's, so  much of the creative work of the Community 
was also a work of destruction. Creating an effective European 
market required first of all the wholesale removal of established 
forms of state discrimination and intervention. To establish con-
ditions of equal competition between states frequently involved 
a  prior  attack  on  the  existing  competitive  distortions  inside 
states. Either the acts of intervention by governments had to be 
justified on some clear rational principle, capable of general ap-
plication throughout the Common Market, or they had to  be 
curbed. 
National Economic Policy Motives Revealed 
A side effect of this attack was to force the underlying motives 
of national economic policy into the open. By making the cri-
teria of government intervention clear and explicit, some forms 
of intervention were in  fact  given  more force.  But during the 
early period,  up to  about  1962, many people refused  to look 
beyond the process of general dismantlement which seemed to 
be pointed at anything and everything that threatened the func-
tioning of a free market. It was not only the critics outside. Some 
inside the Community tended to look on the whole operation as 
a forced march back to the pre-1914 world, to Ia  belle epoque, 
before  governments  had  learned  how  to  tinker  with  the 
economy. 
That this was a deep misunderstanding became progressively 
more apparent as  the Community tackled  its  second round of 
problems which concerned the establishment of managed mar-
kets on a Europe-wide basis. Whereas the main task for Euro-
pean industry was  initially  to  remove the barriers to  the  free 
movement of goods,  when  it  came  to  the  reorganization  of 
European  agriculture  a  quite  different  process  was  involved. 
It was necessary to create a new centralized system of manage-
ment, guided by a number of deliberate decisions taken jointly 
by the members of the Community about such matters as  the 
desired levels of production, the standard of living of producers, 
the volume of supplies to be drawn from the outside world, and 
so on. 
It  took some time before the commentators of the laissez-faire 
school (both pro and contra) woke up to the fact that the Com-
munity was now involved in an exercise in long-range economic 
planning.  Because the chief instrument of agricultural supply 
management was  the price mechanism,  there was  a  tendency 
to treat the whole policy as  if it belonged with  the rest of the 
traditional ideology of the market-place. Some of the argument 
about the EEC in Britain still fails to  recognize that in agricul-
ture the Community is  engaged in  a uniquely ambitious piece 
of  interventionism,  using  a  combination  of  price-fixing  and 
subsidy to  secure long-term structural change in  a  branch of 
production  which  still  employs  more  people  than  any  other 
industry on the European continent. 
Systematic Interventionism-Clearest in Farm Policy 
Yet the Rome Treaty has set out intervention as a point of prin-
ciple clearly from the start. Under Article 42 it specifically stated 
that "the rules of competition" laid down elsewhere in the Treaty 
for trade in  manufactured goods were not to apply to agricul-
tural produce, unless the Council of Ministers positively made 
a  ruling that they should  in  some  particular case.  Any  such 
ruling, moreover, would be guided by  the special aims of the 
Community's agricultural policy. 
These goals have a large welfare component. They are not at 
all concerned with maximizing competition to  reduce prices to 
the lowest possible level. On the contrary, as the latest Annual 
Report of the EEC Commission states in its account of the prin-
ciples  followed  in  setting  the  prices  for  new  products  to  be 
brought under the EEC system of centralized control, "producer 
prices should ... be fixed at the highest level possible compatible 
with other economic requirements ...  " 
Once  the  detailed  behavior  of  the  EEC  is  more  closely 
examined, especially during the second half of the decade since 
the signing of the Rome Treaty, it becomes apparent that the 
foundation principle of the agricultural policy-systematic joint 
intervention by six governments with an agreed set of objectives 
-has in fact been generally applied over a wide range of activi-
ties in industry and commerce as well as in agriculture. What the 
agricultural case brings out with special clarity is that nowadays 
governments can only act effectively in unison with one another 
on matters of economic policy, if they are prepared to  accept 
that their partners will  be  trespassing extensively on the  area 
traditionally marked out as  the purely domestic concern of in-
dependent sovereign states. No effective agricultural agreement 
would have been possible for the Community if the six govern-
ments had not been ready to argue with one another freely about 
changes in some of the most intimate aspects of domestic polit-
ical policy. 
Right of Foreign Interference Established 
What was established on this occasion was the right of foreign 
states  to interfere with  decisions  taken by individual  govern-
ments  about  their treatment of a  particularly numerous  and 
powerful class of voters. And within that class, particular groups 
of farmers and peasants found the very conditions of their live-
lihood changed as a result of the wishes of some remote politi-
cian sitting in a foreign capital. 
Of course it  has happened in the past that trade agreements 
between  two  countries have harmed some economic interests 
and helped others. What is novel in the approach of the Commu-
nity is that the details of each government's method of regulating Andrew  Shonfield,  Director  of  Studies,  the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Lon-
don,  was  formerly  Economic Editor of The 
Observer.  From  1949-57,  he  was  Foreign 
Editor  of  the  Financial  Times.  He  is  the 
author of "British Economic Policy since the 
War"  (1958), "The  Attack  on  World  Pov-
erty"  (1960), and  ''Modern Capitalism: The 
Changing  Balance  of  Public  and  Private 
Power"  (1965). 
the economic affairs of certain of its citizens are from the start 
a matter for international negotiations. 
To take an example from an entirely different sphere of ac-
tivity, the. methods adopted by national railway systems for fix-
ing the rates charged for inward freight (coming from abroad) 
and freight moving outward to the national frontiers  (usually 
for export)  have been subjected to the surveillance of foreign-
ers. That is  because the foreigners' right to be  assured that the 
domestic control of transport rates is not being used as  a clan-
destine  means  of giving  domestic  goods  an  advantage  over 
imported goods is  recognized as  a necessary part of the larger 
bargain on economic collaboration. Or again, in the sphere of 
taxation, the Community has decided that to secure effectively 
equal treatment for the goods of any member country in all parts 
of the  Community,  the  six  countries  must  adopt  a  uniform 
method of indirect taxation, based on the value-added system at 
present operated in France. 
Here then is one country interfering with the sacrosanct bud-
getary decisions of another. In Britain such matters are tradi-
tionally treated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as  a close 
secret, even from fellow members of the Cabinet, until the day 
before Budget Day. Arguing with foreign Ministers of Finance 
in  advance of his Budget would be a new and invigorating ex-
perience for any future incumbent of No. 10 Downing Street. 
He might even be induced in  the process to break down some 
of the grotesque exaggeration of the ritual of Budgetary secrecy 
for the benefit of ordinary British citizens. 
A Decisive Political Shift 
This decisive  shift  in  the  conventional  dividing  line  between 
internal  and external affairs  of sovereign  states  is  the  EEC's 
main political achievement to  date, secured without requiring 
these states to accept the pripr framework of a federal system. 
That is  the novelty of the Treaty as  an instrument of interna-
tional relations. 
Can this instrument be applied more generally, when coun-
tries are involved in a relationship which is  something less than 
a full economic union? The question is  relevant to certain new 
international relationships emerging in the 1960's whose further 
development depends on the systematic blurring of the old sharp 
line between the internal and the external business of nations. 
The method of "multilateral surveillance" adopted by the Group 
of Ten in their financial dealings with one another is one exam-
ple.  The emphasis in  the  Kennedy Round of  negotiations  in 
GATT on "non-tariff obstacles to trade" may point to another. 
· And in an altogether different sphere, there is the growing weight 
' of evidence that any effective  agreement on nuclear disarma-
ment will  require close supervision of the domestic  industrial 
· behavior of the countries taking part in  it. 
The EEC's experience so far suggests that the intimacy be-
tween states,  required  if  certain external  relations become in 
some  measure "internationalized,"  is  unlikely  to  occur unless 
at  least  two  conditions  are  satisfied.  The  nations  concerned 
must  be  approximately equal  in  their  economic development 
and equipped with an advanced and sophisticated administra-
tive  system. It is  not just a  matter of the  state administrative 
apparatus;  the  system  as  a  whole,  including  its  industrial 
management,  must  be  capable  of  responding  with  sensitivity 
and skill  to  the new demands made upon  it. 
Only Pul:)lic's Representatives Can Decide Other Issues 
However,  the  EEC's own experience  with  the  method  is  still 
incomplete. It has had to depend excessively on the administra-
tive ingenuity of the Commission in this major political experi-
ment, because of the absence of effective parliamentary institu-
tions. In the long run the external relationships of nations cannot 
be successfully internalized solely by the efforts of an appointed 
bureaucracy,  however sensitive  it  may  be  to  public  opinion, 
aided by an element of judicial power. Certain tasks do not lend 
themselves  to  administrative  or  judicial  decisions  or  to  the 
process of international diplomacy which  is  conducted  in  the 
Council of Ministers. There are some issues  that can be  suc-
cessfully tackled only  by  the elected  representatives of public 
opinion,  arguing vigorously  with  one  another,  bargaining for 
advantages,  getting angry  at  times,  but always  recognizing  in 
the end that they and the various peoples whom they represent 
have decided to live together on the basis  of a common set of 
rules. 
What Marshall perceived in the plans which his State 
Department staff laid before him was the importance of the 
economic unity of Europe.!/ the nations of Europe could 
be induced to develop their own solution of Europe's economic 
problems, viewed as a whole and tackled cooperatively 
rather than as separate national problems, United States aid 
would be more effective and the strength of a recovered Europe 
would be better sustained. 
HARRY S. TRUMAN 
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9 Changing Trade Issues: 1947-67 
by WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR. 
ANNIVERSARIES CAN BE AWKWARD. Life does not fit naturally into 
the  decimal  system.  And  a  double  anniversary  is  more  than 
twice as likely to make no kind of sense at all. So it is something 
of a marvel that the sequence 1947, 1957, 1967 not only hangs 
together as a framework for comment but is positively stimulat-
ing as an optique for looking at postwar changes in international 
trade. 
Though the  Marshall Plan and the Treaties of Rome were 
concerned with the whole spectrum of international relations, 
each relied on trade to do a central part of its job and each also 
altered the shape of world trade, especially transatlantic trade. 
Each answered certain questions and posed others.  The trade 
problems we  face  in  1967 are to a great degree the result of a 
conjuncture of forces that got going in 194  7 and 1957. While at 
best the Kennedy Round cannot be a drama with the impact of 
the Marshall Plan or the launching of the European Economic 
Community, it could be a major landmark in  the development 
of trade  between  the  United  States  and  the  other industrial 
countries of the world.  And  if it  falls  too  far short of that  it 
could signal a dangerous bend in  the road. 
1947: Marshall Plan Primed Trade to Revive Europe 
There were two great trade problems in  194  7:  Europe and the 
world. The Marshall Plan dealt with some parts of the first and 
had as  part of its several motives American concern with  the 
second. 
It was no joke that Europe had to "export or die" but first it 
had to import to live.  To close the dollar gap eventually it was 
necessary to permit the dollar gap to exist for the time being. 
That was what the Marshall Plan promised to do by providing 
Europe with raw materials, food,  fuel and machinery it could 
not pay for but needed to restore an economy that could earn 
its way in the future. 
To do that, two other things had to be done (more than two, 
but we  speak here of trade alone). First, the  European coun-
tries had to trade more with one another. Only that way could 
they make the most of their own resources and so get the great-
est value from American aid.  Standing in  their way were the 
extraordinary  pressures  on  each  government  to  subordinate 
everything else to the things it could do for itself to earn hard 
currencies, spend soft currencies, and withal meet the demands 
of its  electorate.  The results  were  trade  restrictions,  bilateral 
payments  agreements  and  their  economic  distortions.  In  the 
efforts  to  deal  with  these problems lay  the  first  faint hints of 
1957. 
The second problem lay outside Europe. No matter how well 
European production revived, the Continent's viability depend-
ed on exports and, while all markets were important, the biggest 
in sight was the United States (though it  turned out to be less 
important than Europe itself).  American  production had  ex-
panded and living standards had risen while destruction was the 
order of the day in Europe. 
For Europeans the United States was the land of high tariffs 
and indeed largely so  to  keep  out European manufactures. It 
was the country that would not import enough between the wars 
to let Europeans pay their debts and that met the depression by 
raising tariffs to record heights. Would the Americans be differ-
ent this time? 
Freeing Global Trade Gave Further Stimulus 
That was not just Europe's problem, it was  the United States'. 
Americans thought it not just an Atlantic problem, but a global 
one; not just a question of reconstruction, but of what was to 
follow.  Since  early in  the war the  United States  Government 
had been working toward a comprehensive international agree-
ment that would commit governments to a reduction of trade 
barriers and  the  building  of a  system  of non-discriminatory, 
liberal, multilateral trade. To carry out its responsibilities under 
such an arrangement, the United States had to follow a course 
drastically different from the commercial policy it had pursued 
from Alexander Hamilton to Cordell Hull, but consonant with 
the changes it had begun to introduce in 1934. 
In the same summer of 1947 that saw  the beginning of the 
Marshall  Plan,  there  took  place  the  penultimate  negotiations 
for an International Trade Organization and the completion of 
work on  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  The 
questions these negotiations posed were:  Would an important 
part of the  world  go  along with  these  progressive  ideas  and 
would the United States Congress, and the country as a whole, 
in the end commit themselves to the results of the work that had 
been pursued so  strenuously  by  the administrations in  Wash-
ington? Not surprisingly some of the hardest parts of the nego-
tiations at that stage concerned the restrictions and discrimina-
tion that could be practiced by countries in balance-of-payments 
difficulties (Europe) while countries in stronger trading and pay-
ments positions  (the United States)  moved  toward the greater 
removal of restrictions and continued to grant equal treatment. 
The link was strong between the Marshall Plan and the efforts 
to  create the machinery and  principles of a world trading sys-
tem.  The  trading  world  the  Americans  pictured  required  a 
strong European economy.  Otherwise  the  "network of world 
trade" would  be  rent.  But the  two  years  since  V-E Day had 
taught a hard lesson. 
European  recovery,  Marshall  said,  "will  require  a  much 
longer time  and  greater effort than  had  been  foreseen."  The 
$10 billion or so  already provided for one form or another of 
aid to Europe was not enough. It was aid that was given because 
Europe needed it and the world economy needed Europe. The 
largest loan had gone to Britain precisely because London had 
a key role in world trade and payments. But in  1947, the money 
ran out, partly because of a premature effort to make sterling 
convertible in  accordance with the American world picture. 
The great initiative of 1947 had answered a crying need but, 
at the same time, raised new questions. 
1957: U.S. Free Trade Initiative Ran  Down 
Ten years  later  those  questions  looked  different,  but one,  at 
least, had been answered. There was no longer doubt about the 
strength of the European economy. Not only had it reached new 
heights of production, consumption and exports but its  rate of 
growth also seemed to have become immune to  American re-
cessions.  Access to the American market seemed dramatically 
assured. The United States imported over $3  billion from Mar-
shall Plan Europe in  1957, compared to $666 million ten years 
before.  Trade generally  was  booming,  but Europe's share  of 
American imports had doubled. 
Even so,  the old question about American trade policy had \\ illiirlrt I)iebold, .fr., Scnior' l{cscurch  Fcl-
Itlu. ('orrncil ()11 Forcign I{clations. was ir
llcrrbcl tll'thc  U.S. [)cpurtntcnt of  Statc
1'rrrrtt 1915-17. ln his privlrtc re:sclrrch. N,lr'
Dicbrllcl ltas conccntratcd on U.S. forcign
ccorrtlr.r.ric  policy'. internatittnlrl  ccononric rc-
lirt ions. Wcstcrn Frrropcan intcgration. anrl
r.lr()r'c t'cccnl lr'. Al'rtclr.
rot died. In view of thc statistics. this looked like cultural rag.
lut there was sonre evidence to worry about. TarilTs hacr
reen raised against somc traditional European  exports,  notably
vatches and bicycles, and quotas had been put on Danish blLre
:heese, thc sales of which had been fostered as part of the Mar-
hall Plan. But the use of the escape clause, which worriecr
-urope so much, was exccptional; out of 4l applications nracle
n the years 1953 through 1956, only four led to an incrcase in
luties. Though the reductions  macle in the American tariff as a
esLrlt of the bargaining  undcr GATT at Geneva in 1956 were
airly modest,  they followcd very substantial cuts made in carlier
'ears.
It was a pcriod of running down rather than reversal. What
rad becn lost was the Amcrican initiative in reducing  tracre
rarriers. In 1955 Congress  had restricted the Presiclent's  powcrs
rnder the Trade Agreement Act (which had been cxpancrecr  in
945) , and there was no strong disposition to use even these to
he fullest extent. Part of the cxplanation  may havc been the
apparcnt one-sidedness  ol' w,hat had happencd  since I 917. Be-
callse of the dollar shortacc, tariff cuts by Europc  ancl Japan
meant little for American  exports whilc quotas  and exchungc
controls remained in force, but American tariff redLrctions  took
effect right away. I-ower tarifls,  con-rbinecl  with the rccovcry of
European  and Japanese production,  macle imports conspicuous
in the Anterican ccononty. In 1957 Amcrican  cxports to N{ar-
shall Plan Europe for thc first time wcrc as high as thcy haci bcen
in 1947-but  ntorc of them wcre paicl for.
So, while the question about rvhat the Unitecl States wor_rld be
willing to do to libcralize trade remained  a question,  it arosc at
a new level. As to the creation of a world trading systcm,  1957
had answercd some of 1947's questions. The ITO was deacl, for
complex  reasons-largcly  American-but unaccompanied by
any European  grief. GATT was very much alive and appeared
to be a resilient working arrangcmcnt that had played an im-
portant part in rcducing barriers to worlcl tradc in manufacturcd
goods. Its effect on agricultural  trade was less impressive;  while12 
domestic American farm policies seemed  to contribute a  dis-
proportionate  share  to  the  difficulties,  balance-of-payments 
restrictions still sheltered other countries. 
The Rome Treaty Raised  New Trade Questions 
The great new trade questions of 1957 were those of the Treaty 
of Rome. Would it work? If a European common market were 
created, who, eventually, would be  in  it?  What kind of trade 
policy would the new entity follow toward the rest of the world? 
The aspiration for European unity was old but clear. The con-
temporary manifestations were of several orders. Very practical 
work on the removal of barriers to intra-European trade in the 
OEEC had played an important part in the economic recovery 
but had left national jurisdictions largely intact. The imaginative 
leap of the Monnet-Schuman plan for coal and steel t.hat  had 
followed looked like a radical new departure. The defeat of the 
European Defense Community in 1954 and its attendant politi-
cal  community and  common market  had  seemed  to  set  new 
bounds. Then Messina, aided by Suez, set a new drive in motion. 
When the two Treaties of Rome were signed, many eyes focused 
on Euratom, though the other's scope was greater. But would it 
work? 
The commitments for forming a customs union for manufac-
tured goods were  clear, but would the built-in provisions  for 
delay be  utilized,  especially if an important member found it 
hard to live with the conditions of an open European economy? 
France seemed only too likely to be in that position. If it could 
be done, if trade could be freed among old economies, heredi-
tary rivals, whose historical barriers were mostly directed against 
one another  ....  If  it could, then the implications were enormous, 
not just for Western Europe but for the rest of the world. 
New questions arose as rapidly as one could pose them. If  this 
great nexus of trade could  be  freed  of all  barriers,  what was 
possible for  the  rest  of world trade,  or at least  trade  among 
industrial countries with some degree of political affinity? The 
Six were only a part of Western Europe. Was Europe in unifying 
to be split? Would others join? Where would the line run around 
Europe? What would be the position of other trading countries, 
notably the United States, Canada, and Japan, who accounted 
for an important share of world trade? Still another question, 
barely visible in 1957, arose when France insisted on association 
Progress toward the economic integration of Europe requires 
action on many fronts.  The peoples of Europe can be expected 
to make these necessary drastic adjustments with confidence 
in the success of their efforts only if they have confidence 
that we are prepared to cooperate with them ... 
Readjustments of United States economic policies will be 
necessary. The problem which confronts us can be stated very 
simply: to maintain the volume of American exports which 
the free world needs and which it is in our national interest to 
supply as a necessary part of building a successfully functioning 
political and economic system, the free  world must obtain 
the dollars to pay for these exports. 
DEAN ACHESON 
STRENGTHENING  THE  FORCES  OF  FREEDOM,  U.S.  Department  of 
State, Washington, D.C., 1950. 
arrangements for its  then dependent African territories.  How 
would the proposed European Community deal with the under-
developed world? 
Verbal answers meant to be comforting came quick and fast, 
but only time would tell how valid they were. 
1967: Inflexible Farm Trade Policies Crossed the Atlantic 
In another decade the trade questions had changed again. Had 
the reading been taken at the halfway mark, in 1962, the changes 
would have seemed even greater. That year, Britain seemed on 
the verge of joining the European Community's pell-mell rush 
toward economic unity. The United States stood ready to free 
trade with "the new Europe" as a step toward "partnership." 
In 1967, the Community's pace was slower, Britain's position 
unsure, and the bloom off the American initiative. It was indeed 
a different world, but different also from 1947 and 1957. 
Europe's economic strength validated 1957's answer to 1947's 
question. Trade had been freed inside Europe, within EFTA as 
within the Six,  though what the future relations between them 
would be was still in doubt. The United States was still pursuing 
its line of 1947 and 1957-working toward the liberalization of 
trade on a multilateral basis-although it  had for some years 
been struggling with balance of payments difficulties  of a sort 
wholly alien to it in those earlier years. 
Though  it  might  seem  incautious  to  predict  how  liberal  a 
"free trader" the United States would prove at the moment of 
final  decision,  most  observers  agreed  that  it  was  ready  to  go 
farther than the Common Market was.  And for a change the 
agricultural shoe was on the other hoof. The common agricul-
tural policy put the Common Market governments in as  inflex-
ible  a position in  discussing farm trade barriers as  the United 
States had been  over much of the past two decades. The out-
come of this interplay of facts and suppositions is  locked in the 
Kennedy Round.  When  it  ends,  it  will  be  easier to  compare 
1967 with its counterparts of 10 and 20 years earlier. 
On the outcome of the Kennedy Round hang also large ques-
tions about the impact of Europe's kind of economic regional-
ism on the trading structure of the world. The convertibility of 
European currencies that came in  1958, some subsequent re-
duction in trade barriers, and the continued growth of produc-
tion  and  trade  brought Western  Europe  more  fully  into  the 
world economy than at any time since the end of the war. The 
conditions needed for building the kind of multilateral trading 
world envisaged by postwar planners (many of them American) 
in 1943 and 1944 were more fully met in 1967 than in 194  7 or 
1957. 
Europe: A Constructive or a Disruptive Force? 
But maybe the  world had changed course. A  massive trading 
bloc in Western Europe, whatever its ultimate dimensions, might 
fit into such a trading world as a major participant, but it might 
also change the whole shape of it by the emulation it  incited, 
the defensive reactions it  inspired, or the temptation it offered 
others to come to terms with it. The counterpart of the extraor-
dinary progress in removing trade barriers within the Common 
Market has  been  the  creation of external  trade  barriers that 
both protect the commercial privileges of insiders and act as a 
political and psychological cement. If the outcome of the Ken-nedy Round reinforces these new qualities instead of indicating 
that the region's external barriers are as susceptible to modifica-
tion as are national tariffs in  the rest of the world, then impor-
tant new  questions  will  arise.  Major  outside  trading  nations, 
such as the United States, Japan and Canada will have to decide 
whether they can afford to persist in past patterns or must look 
for new approaches, possibly even new partners. The effects will 
be  felt too by underdeveloped countries,  including both those 
that have a privileged position in the Common Market and those 
who find  themselves discriminated against.  Even the future of 
the growing East-West trade relations will look rather different. 
If, however, the Kennedy Round substantially reduces trade 
barriers, quite a different prospect emerges. The remaining trade 
barriers will  still be important, regionalism will  continue to be 
a major new factor in world trade, the problems of East-West 
trade will  still  be unsolved, and the rich nations will  continue 
to have before them the complicat~d questions of what they can 
reasonably do to improve the trading positions of the poor ones. 
~ut trade among the industrialized countries-Western Europe, 
"lorth America, and Japan, at least- will not follow the same 
ines as in  1947, 1957 or even early 1967. 
The common agricultural policy has invigorated the old dif-
iculties that brought so many past negotiations to an impasse, 
JUt  the Kennedy Round has opened a new possibility for free-
ng agricultural trade. Instead of limiting the bargaining to trade 
Jarriers,  negotiations  would  deal  with  farm  policies-prices, 
Jroduction, and subsidies. The course is difficult. A world food 
;hortage may make it easier to agree on some point. Eventually 
:he forces that have changed American agricultural policy may 
Jegin to operate in Europe as well. 
World Trade Surge Has Altered Meaning of "Tariff" 
fhe surge of international trade in the last 20 years has altered 
:raditional  patterns  of  "pro~ected" and  "export"  interests-
:ven of what is  foreign  and domestic.  Increasingly specializa-
:ion  takes  place  within  industries  not just  between  them.  In-
:reasingly  industries  find  themselves  interested  in  reduciti.g 
'oreign  trade  barriers  as  well  as  maintaining  domestic  ones. 
::very year more firms  produce in  more countries, sometimes 
icquiring a stake in a foreign country's tariff levels. Sometimes 
.hese  companies pay little attention to  tariffs  as  they  develop 
Jatterns of production and trade that span a  large part of the 
ll'orld.  American-owned  firms  in  Western  Europe  sell  more 
~oods than the United States exports to the area. Inevitably the 
neaning of trade barriers alters and with it the balance of pres-
:ure for preserving old patterns. 
Non-tariff  barriers  seem  more  important  in  the  Kerinedy 
~ound  than they were before. If  tariffs are further reduced other 
rade barriers, private practices and public regulations previous-
y  considered  essentially  domestic  will  provoke  international 
:oncern. European objections to the new American safety stand-
1rds for automobiles is but a harbinger. 
The Common Market countries' travail over turnover taxes 
-which goes back to the early '50's-is likely to be re-enacted 
m  a  broader stage.  Churchill's  remark about the Americans 
;nd British being "somewhat mixed up together in some of their 
ffairs"  may well  apply with increasing force to  the economic 
elations  of the  industrialized  countries  on both  sides  of the 
l.tlantic and the Pacific. 
If  it does, then 1967 will take its proper place in the sequence 
from  1947 and  1957.  But  anniversary  writers should be  cau-
tious. To look back is easier than to look forward.  In 194  7 no 
one properly foresaw  1957 and,  in  1957,  1967 was  mostly in-
visible. 
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Would New  Marshall Plans Work~ 
byTHEODORE GEIGER 
AS  THE  20TH ANNIVERSARY of the  Marshall  Plan approaches, 
analogies are already being drawn between  the European Re-
covery Program  (ERP)  of 1948-52 and  the  efforts  today  to 
assist the development of Asia, Africa and Latin America.  In-
deed,  frustrated  by  the limited  accomplishments  and seeming 
interminableness  of current foreign  aid  programs,  people  on 
both sides of the Atlantic have periodically urged new "Marshall 
Plans." But is  this suggestion appropriate? 
Advocates  of a  Marshall  Plan for  Asia,  Africa  and  Latin 
America usually have in mind three characteristics of the ERP. 
First, it was a joint effort of the United States and the European 
recipient countries. Its central cooperative feature was  a  peri-
odic mutual review of national recovery efforts  conducted  in 
a common institution, the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC). Second, the United States made enough 
funds  available  to  accomplish the  purpose within  a  specified 
period.  Moreover,  they were  expended  rapidly  under flexible 
procedures  with  comparatively  little  friction  between  donor 
and recipients.  Third, enthusiasm and a sense of commitment 
on both sides of the Atlantic animated the ERP. The participat-
ing governments had both the willingness to  innovate and the 
expectation of success. 
It is  essentially these  three  features-effective  intergovern-
mental cooperation, massive funds provided for a short specified 
period,  and dedicated  enthusiasm-that the  proponents  of a 
new Marshall Plan seek to  recapture today. There can be no 
doubt that they were major factors in the success of the ERP. 
However, they also indicated the presence of other, more fun-
damental characteristics  in  the  participating  countries.  These 
basic factors have not yet evolved  in Asia or Africa,  and are 
only beginning to develop in Latin America. 
ERP Assisted Reconstruction 
Despite the economic, political and social disruption caused by 
Nazi conquest and occupation, the societies of Western Europe 
still preserved after the war the capabilities and skills that they 
had developed to unprecedented heights during preceding cen-
turies.  Though some  were  deeply  riven  by  struggles  between 
democratic governments  and  their communist  opponents,  all 
continued to  possess  at least the  minimum  capacity  to  make 
firm  decisions  regarding  national  goals  and  to  fix  priorities 
among them. Many experienced administrators in  government 
and the private sector had been killed during the war or barred 
as  collaborators from  their occupations after it,  but there was 
a sufficient number of men and women with the motivation and 
the training for carrying out effectively  national recovery  poli-
cies and programs. 
Despite  the  widespread  destruction  of factories,  railroads, 
ports,  power systems  and  other productive  facilities  and  the 
great shortages  of capital equipment,  replacement parts,  raw 
materials, fuel,  and operating supplies, the economies of West-
ern Europe were nonetheless industrialized. They had  an ade-
quately skilled labor force, knowledge of mass-production tech-
niques,  and a  readily  reconstituted  network  of inter-industry 
relationships and of ancillary financial,  commercial, technical, 
and other essential services. Much farmland  was  uncultivated 
and  seeds,  fertilizers,  farm  equipment,  and  other  necessary 
production  inputs  were  scarce.  But  the  farmers  of Western 
Europe knew  how  to  use  the efficient  agricultural  techniques 
developed for temperate-zone crops, and before the war many 
of them had achieved some of the highest outputs per acre in 
the world. 
These were the foundations of the Marshall Plan's success-
a success not likely to be duplicated without similar foundations. 
The Europeans could  cooperate  effectively  with  one  another 
and  with  the  United  States  because  they  possessed  the  self-
confidence derived from  their long-standing sense of national 
identity and from the successful exercise of national sovereignty 
both domestically  and  in  their  external  relations.  The  Euro-
peans could spend rapidly and effectively large amounts of U.S. 
aid because they already had the necessary capacity for decision-
making and administration  and  the  developed  industrial  and 
agricultural systems to  absorb additional resources quickly and 
productively.  The Europeans had the  requisite  sense  of dedi-
cated enthusiasm and the motivation to  innovate because  the 
relevant values  and  behavioral norms had long been  integral 
elements of their inherited cultural traditions. In these circum-
stances, all that was needed for European recovery were sizable 
injections of economic resources over a short period. American 
grants and loans made this temporary "pump-priming" possible. 
Basic Social Change-Task of Today 
In contrast, the task confronting the newly independent nations 
of Asia and Africa and the older nations of Latin America  is 
not rehabilitation of an  existing economic  system  but funda-
mental social change. 
For Asia and Africa, social change involves a gigantic trans-
formation.  It  means  replacing  many  different  varieties  of 
traditional,  homogeneous,  stable,  low-productivity  agrarian 
societies with new types of modern, diversified, and much more 
productive market-oriented societies. For Latin America, even 
though it has  been a part of Western civilization,  it  means  a 
somewhat less  profound but,  nonetheless,  difficult  moderniza-
tion process to overcome the inhibiting effects of its late medie-
val  Iberian heritage  and of four-and-a-half  centuries of com-
parative stagnation. There are  major  differences  between  the 
development process in Asia and Africa and the modernization 
process in Latin America. However, both involve basic changes 
in the main institutional systems  of their societies  and in  the 
motivating  values,  attitudes  and  behavioral  norms  of  their 
cultures. 
In Western Europe, additional economic resources were the 
sole significant factor that had to  be  supplied from  outside to 
get European recovery under way.  In contrast, additional eco-
nomic resources from outside is one-but only one-of the fac-
tors that are missing or inadequate and that crucially affect the 
nature  and  rate  of social  change  in  Asia,  Africa,  and  Latin 
America. Except in the few large Latin American countries that 
already possess social groups with modern attitudes and indus-
trial systems of sufficient size, financial and technical assistance 
is not likely by itself to make a critical difference. 
Space does not permit a discussion of the other, much more' 
important, factors  involved.  Suffice  it  to  say,  that neither the 
development process in Asia and Africa nor the modernization 
process in Latin America is or will be  rapid and easy.  Both will 
continue to be full of uncertainties and dangers. Theodore Geiger, Chief of  International
Studies, National Planning Association,  began
his association with the Marshall  Plan after
serving from 1945-47 with the U.S. Mission
for Economic Affairs. As a staff member  of
the House of Representatives  Select Commit-
tee on Foreign Aid (Herter Committee),  Mr.
Geiger helped to prepare the Marshall  Plan
legislation. As Special  Assistant for European
regional affairs in the Economic  Cooperation
Administration, Mr. Geiger participated  in
the administration of Marshall Plan funds.
"TheConflicted  Relationship:TheWest  ancl the
Transformation  of Asia,Africa,and Lati nAmer-
ica," his latest book, appeared  in February.
This activist and directive approach-often euphemistically
rationalized as cooperation or joint participation-has an
ambivalent effect. On the one hand, it has macle possible the
short-term expenditure  of a comparatively large volume of
development  assistance funds for purposes  and in ways berieved
desirable by the donors,  although not always by the recipients.
on the other, it has inhibited the longer term evolution of the
capability for self-help, the self-confidence,  and the sense of
self-responsibility  that are indispensable for substantial  ancl
lasting development  progress.
The capacity  f'or coordination of policies  and programs,  ntu-
tual review, and joint efforts like those of the Europeans through
the oEEC,  varies widely between Latin America ancl Asia and
Africa. certainly, the common institutions of the Ailiance for
Progress have yielded benefits far beyond the efforts ancl costs
involved. Still, in comparison  with the OEEC, the Alliance has
achieved  much less coordination ancl the mutual review pro-
cedure is far less effective.
The differences between  countries  needing only economic  re-
habilitation  and those experiencing  major social transformation
explain the seeming discrepancy  of results. The basic issues in
Latin American  modernization concern, antong other contplex
relationships, the distribution of econonric  wealth and income,
political power,  and social prestige.  These fundamental  prob-
lems express themselves in the form of social struggles  over
such issues as agrarian reform, tax refornr, denrocratization ol'
governments, and emancipation  fronr inherited patronal and
nANil3']948,PrsidentHurrS.Trnnrnsig||el,hcFo|.'ignAssi!lt4ceActo|1948'au||tofizi,|gtheM.u'sh(l|lPlon.su|lit|!!
nder Secrctary ol Cornnere llillian C. Foster: W. Arrll  Har nra , Chaina of tle Presiicnt's CoDtninec o  Forig ,qiit: pntri o. otman,|hefrs|Administfto|oltheMafsl|allPlon;SenatorTotncottolly,ch4i|0]o||lteScna|eForig,
'State Dea Acheson.
4arshall Plan Analogy-A Hindrance?
n these circumstances,  use of the Marshall Plan analogy has
robably done more harm than good for American  and Euro-
ean development assistance efforts in the past l5 years.
Because the ERP was limited to a fixed numbers of years,
fforts to fulfill the analogy have had to involve the setting of
recific program periods and objectives-as in the Alliance for
rogress and the UN Decade of Development.  Neither terminal
ates nor quantitative targets are relevant to the long-term
:quirements  for development  assistance  or the uncertain
rospects for development progress.  Failure to achieve  these
nrealistic  expectation  of the progress possible within the time
eriod specified has disillusioned both sides of the foreign aid
lationship.
The European  countries' ability to assume the responsibility
lr initiating and executing  recovery  policies and programs
elped to generate unrealistic  expectations as to the performance
f Asian, African and Latin American  aid recipients. At first,
was assumed that they possessed comparable  decision making,
rogramming and administrative  capabilities.  When this as-
tmption  proved unfounded in most cases, the reaction  went
r the other extreme. During the past ten years, the aid-giving
ations, especially the two largest dor crs, the United States and
rance, have in different ways allowed-indeed, required-
reir own personnel stationed in the recipient countries to as-
rme major responsibilities for initiating,  planning and even
(ecuting development policies and programs.
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paternalistic relationships.  Civil servants and technicians can-
not  resolve  these  issues  merely  by  rational  consideration  of 
costs  and benefits.  Hence,  although  the  Alliance  machinery 
usefully  sets  examples  and brings  about a  certain  amount of 
mutual pressure on ministers and public officials, it cannot pro-
vide much leverage for forcing the pace of fundamental eco-
nomic,  political,  and social  reforms.  In Asia and Africa,  the 
basic problems are so much deeper and the  capacity for co-
operation so much less than in Latin America that OEEC-type 
arrangements should not be  expected to achieve  anything ap-
proaching the degree  of effectiveness  that they have  attained 
under the Alliance for Progress. 
It is questionable whether the dedicated enthusiasm that ani-
mated the Marshall Plan can be achieved, much less sustained, 
in  Asia  and  Africa and even  in  Latin America.  In  Western 
Europe, not only was economic recovery a comparatively simple 
and well-understood task but there was also widespread agree-
ment that it  was essential and had to  be  accorded the highest 
priority. Neither in Asia or Africa nor in Latin America is there 
as yet so wide or firm a consensus regarding the overriding pri-
ority of development and modernization. Moreover, these proc-
esses, far more complex than economic recovery, are very much 
Jess well-understood. 
Even among the technically  trained elite,  usually the most 
enthusiastic supporters of development and modernization, in-
dividual interests and group loyalties compete for the resources, 
attention,  and personal commitment essential for accelerating 
such difficult  social  processes.  These  requirements  for faster 
progress are also diverted into efforts to  realize other national 
objectives, internal and external. The realities of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America simply do not bear out the typical American 
image of these regions as  single-mindedly committed to press-
ing on with development and modernization. If they did, half 
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the  difficulties  of development  and  modernization  would  be 
overcome. 
Crash Programs Do Not Suit Development Task 
If  the Marshall Plan experience holds lessons for current devel-
opment assistance efforts, they point more to doing and expect-
ing  the opposite of what was  done  and expected in  the  ERP 
instead of copying its distinctive characteristics. To be effective, 
aid to Asia, Africa, and Latin America must be conceived and 
established as  a continuing activity without specifying terminal 
dates in advance. Assured continuity of funding and maximum 
flexibility  in setting the terms and conditions of assistance are 
more important over the longer term than the magnitude of the 
funds  available in any  one year.  Even in the best of circum-
stances, the transformation of Asia and Africa will take genera-
tions  and  the  modernization  of  Latin  America  will  require 
decades. A crash program for a fixed  period of years, even as 
many as ten, is quite inappropriate to the time spans of the de-
velopment and modernization  processes.  This does  not mean 
that more development aid would be undesirable or that, in time, 
it could not be spent effectively. It does mean that the additional 
resources that could be efficiently and quickly absorbed are sub-
stantially  less  for  most  recipient countries  than  was  the  case 
during the ERP. 
Equally necessary is  recognition that the self-help principle, 
upon which the United States quite rightly insists,  has implica-
tions  not only for the  aid  recipients  but also  for  the  donors. 
The social transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
though immensely important, cannot be dealt with as an emer-
gency  requiring the greatest possible effort in  the shortest pos-
sible time. True, emergencies caused by natural disasters or sud-
den, drastic, political or economic dangers do occur and have 
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to  be  dealt with  as  such.  But these situations are exceptional. 
Hence,  in  resolving the self-help ambivalences implicit in the 
donor-recipient relationship, preference should be given to fos-
tering the  self-reliance  and self-responsibility  of the  recipient 
countries over the longer term, rather than to maximizing by 
any means their absorption of development assistance funds in 
· the shorter term. 
Effective Self-Help Needs Passive Donors 
I The  donor  countries,  particularly  the  United  States,  should 
probably  reverse  their  approach  to  development  assistance. 
· Now, the donors encourage the recipient countries  to  request 
aid,  suggest the  specific kinds  of programs  and projects they 
should undertake, and help them prepare and execute the re-
sulting development plans. 
Instead,  the  donors  should  take  a  passive  attitude.  They 
should  respond  to  the  initiatives  of  the  recipient  countries, 
specifying in advance, if they wish, the kinds of programs and 
projects  they  would finance  and the  terms  and  conditions  of 
their aid.  Perhaps the donors might advise  the recipients  how 
and where to obtain technical assistance in  preparing and exe-
cuting programs, but the donor countries should not make their 
own officials available for these purposes. Instead of staffing to 
cover all major fields of activity and to prepare their own coun-
try  programs,  most  U.S.  aid  missions  would  then  need  only 
small liaison groups to  react to the initiatives of the recipient 
nations. Such a change in the "posture" of the donors would not 
only give greateneality to the self-help principle but also dimin-
ish  significantly  the political  and  psychological  strains  in  the 
relationships between North America and Western Europe, on 
the one hand, and Asia, Africa and Latin America, on the other. 
In sum, what is needed today for helping more effectively the 
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are not new Mar-
shall Plans but more profound understanding of the complexities 
of development and modernization and more relevant ways of 
fostering  the  capacity of the  recipient  countries for  deciding 
upon their own transformation strategies and for implementing 
them more  efficiently  through  their  own  efforts.  Just  as  the 
amount of aid and the manner of providing it under the Mar-
shall Plan were appropriate for Europe's temporary needs and 
manifest capabilities, so today the financial and technical assist-
ance programs of the Western nations have to be  suited to the 
possibilities and the limitations of the countries engaged in  the 
much longer and far more difficult  processes  of development 
and modernization. 
Paul G. Hoffman, administrator of the United 
Nations Development Programs. His  involve-
ment  in  international  development  began 
with  his  appointment  by  President  Truman 
in  1948  as  the  first  Administrator  of  the 
Marshall Plan (ECA). 
THE CONCEPT OF AN  ECONOMICALLY UNITED EUROPE was  in the 
minds of many Atlantic statesmen in  the  immediate  postwar 
period. However, it is Jean Monnet who certainly deserves great 
credit for the leading part he  took  in  translating that  concept 
into  an  action  program.  High  on the  list  of  those  associated 
with  him  were  Robert  Schuman,  Paul-Henri  Spaak,  Walter 
Hallstein, Etienne Hirsch and Robert Marjolin. 
The enthusiasm of the European statesmen for an integrated 
European economy was  shared by  the  Americans  responsible 
for administrating the Marshall Program, among them, Averell 
Harriman, William Foster, the late Howard Bruce, Milton Katz, 
Richard Bissell and Lincoln Gordon. Their attitude can be ex-
pressed  in  this  excerpt  from  my  first  address  to  the  OEEC 
Council in July 1948. 
While  there  has  been  a  growing  conviction  that  it  is  in  the 
deepest interests of the United States that Europe should again 
become a living,  workable and independent economic and po-
litical organization, there has at  the same time been a growing 
conviction that this goal cannot be set in  the frame  of an old 
picture or traced on an  old design. It cannot be brought about 
by old ways of doing business or through old concepts of how a 
nation's interests are  best served. New patterns  of intra-Euro-
pean trade and exchange must be found and new directions in 
the  use  of Europe's resources.  These  are  made necessary  not 
alone by the drastic consequences of two wars, but also  hy the 
tides of change that run longer and deeper. 
In the opinion of the Marshall Plan Administration, nothing 
to  which the  Marshall  Plan may  have  contributed  was  more 
significant  than the organization of the  Coal and Steel  Com-
munity and, later, of the European Economic Community and 
the European Atomic Energy Community. The European Com-
munity has already played a large part in what has been called 
the "miracle of recovery" in Western Europe. It is  to  be hoped 
that before too long the Inner Six and the Outer Seven will unite 
and make a reality of that strong and efficient European econ-
omy which was envisioned in  1948. Nothing would contribute 
more to continued prosperity and peace among the European 
countries. 
PAUL G.  HOFFMAN 
The  United States looks on this vast new enterprise with hope 
and admiration. We do not regard a strong and united Europe 
as a rival but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the basic 
objective of our foreign  policy for 17 years.  We believe that a 
united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in 
the common defense, of responding more generously to the 
needs of poorer nations, of joining with the  United States and 
others  in  lowering  trade  barriers,  resolving  problems of cur-
rency and commodities, and developing coordinated policies 
in all other economic, diplomatic, and political areas. We see 
in  such a  Europe a  partner  with  whom  we  could deal  on  a 
basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of 
huildinR and defending a community of free nations. 
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY 
Address at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pa., July 4, 1962  17 "Technology Gap" Demands 
"Hard Cho1ces" of Europe 
by BOYD FRANCE 
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A THOUSAND YEARS, Western Europe no 
longer leads the  parade of human progress. Thoughtful Euro-
peans are worried. That is what the rising concern over the so-
called "technology gap" basically is  about. 
True, the term  is  shorthand for a  growing number of eco-
nomic  inequalities  between  the  United  States  and  Western 
Europe-in management practice,  size  of firms  and  markets, 
availability of risk capital, education, attitudes towards change. 
The "technology gap" by any other name remains as worrisome 
to thoughtful Europeans. 
Harold Wilson warns the  Council of Europe of the  danger 
of "industrial helotry" and calls for  a European technological 
community. Amintore Fanfani urges a "technological Marshall 
Plan" under NATO. President Johnson responds by  setting up 
a high level inter-agency committee under his  science advisor, 
Donald Hornig, to  explore ways  in  which  the  U.S.  could co-
operate. Western Europe, in  1945, feared Soviet political domi-
nation. Two  decades  later,  Europeans fear economic depend-
ence upon the United States. 
Europe's response to  the Soviet threat was to invigorate the 
European economy by knocking down trade barriers, a process 
now culminating in  the customs union of the Six  and the  free 
trade area of the Seven.  But  these  larger markets are proving 
uncomfortable  half-way  houses.  Big  fast-moving  American 
firms find  themselves more at home in  them  than smaller less 
efficient European companies which feel pushed to the wall. 
Full Western  European  economic  integration  would  seem 
the only answer.  Britain, which spends  $6.00 ~n research and 
development for  every  $9.00  the  Common  Market  countries 
spend, obviously could not be  left out. Worry over the  "tech-
nology gap" is  indeed the sharpest spur toward economic inte-
gration but no insurance of an adequate response. 
The American role  in  any effort to  narrow the "technology 
gap" must be  at best  a supporting one.  The main effort must 
come from Europe. The U.S. stake in the outcome is  immense. 
Today as in 1945 the United States sees no alternative to a strong 
and  confident  Western  Europe  as  insurance  against  war,  a 
bridge to the East and as a partner by necessity in the manage-
ment of the world economy. 
Technology Gap Varies According to Perspective 
To be persuaded of the need for a radical approach 10 the "tech-
nology gap" one must examine it  more closely.  The view  can 
be confusing since, like the Cheshire Cat, it appears and vanishes 
depending upon one's angle of vision. 
Look  at  it  one  way  and  the  "gap''  gapes  wide  and  clear. 
Europeans watch  Americans walk  about in  space-or attend 
an international auction of a Picasso painting-via an Ameri-
can-built-and-launched  communications  satellite.  The  U.S. 
spends  four  times  as  much  as  does  Europe on  research  and 
development, has four  times  as  many scientists and engineers 
working full  time.  The U.S.  Government foots  75  percent of 
the  research and development bill  to  improve  already appall-
ingly  effective  weapons  and to  put a  man on the  moon.  Few 
would deny that this military research spins off not only a daz-
zling shower of concepts  and  processes  useful  to  earthbound 
men but new  sciences not dreamed of a decade or two  ago. 
That's not all. Every year, thousands of expensively-educated 
European scientists and engineers are drawn to  the U.S. by the 
magnet of the American research dynamo-and by  plump sal-
aries.  Many stay  on,  not only  depriving their  native  lands  of 
their services  but giving  the  fly-wheel  of  U.S.  technical  and 
economic progress another spin. 
Giant U.S.-controlled multinational companies deploy  their 
awesome financial, managerial, and technical power across po-
litical frontiers over vast spaces of the earth, forerunners per-
haps  of a  new  species  of international  social  organism.  With 
only slightly more than 2 per cent of total private investment 
in Western Europe they yet dominate key  growth industries-
computers, carbon black, synthetic rubber, agricultural equip-
ment. They also  have a strong position in  the European auto-
mobile industry. 
U.S. Science at Control Panel in Age of Science 
In space, in the air, in data processing, telemetry, nuclear power, 
radio astronomy, lasers, solid state physics, the development of 
magical materials able to withstand the awful vacuum and fierce 
temperatures of space-in these and an expanding maze of new 
disciplines American science and technology over-master their 
"Clearly less efjecti1·e exploitation of teclmology. not a lag in  technological knowledge, puts Europe on tile dejensil'e." "Science" for these young 
students at a Dutch preparatory technical school combines theory and laboratory sessions. Boyd  France,  Foreign  Affairs Correspondent 
in  Washington  for  Business  Week  and  other 
McGraw-Hill  Publications since  1951, is  now 
also  acting  as  editorial  consultant  to  the 
Twentieth  Century  Fund  for  a study  of the 
technological  disparity  between  the  U.S.  and 
Europe.  From  1945-4S  in  Paris,  Mr.  France 
was  a reporter for the  Paris Post, Diplomatic 
Correspondent for  Reuters Limited, and news 
commentator for  the  American  Broadcasting 
Company and  Radio Diffusion Fmnraise. 
rivals. The profound revolution which computers are working 
upon  the  nervous  system  of human  society  is  a  measure  of 
change to come. American science is  at the control panel. 
Understandably,  thoughtful  Europeans  are worried.  Tech-
nology determines the power of men and  nations  to  achieve 
their earthly goals. Europeans fear that increasing dependence 
, on hand-me-down technology from the U.S. will lead in the end 
to economic and even political dependence upon the  U.S.  It's 
a matter of pride, to be sure, but not necessarily false pride. 
No one has yet thought through the economic implications 
of the disparity between the strength of science-based industries 
in the U.S. and Europe. They must be large. 
If Britain and France launch the Concorde successfully and 
the U.S.  enters no supersonic transport of its  own in  the lists, 
the  U.S.  balance-of-payments  deficit  could  widen  by  tens  of 
billions of dollars. By the same token, the slowness with which 
the  U.S.  steel  industry  adopted  the  oxygenation  process  in-
vented in Europe probably cost the U.S. $1.5 billion a year in 
increased steel imports, not to mention lost third market sales. 
But the political implications really sting. It is  easy to exag-
gerate  them  and perhaps France's President  de  Gaulle does, 
but the awkward facts remain. The U.S. forbade IBM to lease 
certain types of computers to the French Government for use 
in development and targeting of the force de frappe. Washing-
ton has also blocked sales of European-made aircraft to com-
munist China by virtue of the fact that some of the technology 
incorporated in the planes was U .S.-owned. 
Looked at in this way, the "technology gap" appears at once 
i formidable and manageable. The U.S. has a big head start which 
! gives  it  an  increasingly  commanding  position  of  economic 
' strength. The answer is simply for Western Europe to acquire 
more first-ranking technological know-how abroad and to  step 
up its research and development effort. 
Technology Is the Fruit of Growth, Not the Root 
Viewed from another angle  the "technology gap"  is  only one 
of many factors affecting economic vigor and growth. There is 
reason to believe indeed that advanced technology often is  the 
fruit rather than the root of the complex economic growth proc-
ess.  Note, for  example: 
•  Despite greater investments in research and development than 
any of the Common Market countries, Britain has consistently 
had the slowest growth rate. 
•  The EEC has grown consistently faster than the Unted States 
despite its technological lag. 
•  Germany is the second largest exporting country in the world 
and more than 80 per cent of its exports are finished goods. 
•  Although Japan has virtually no indigenous research and de-
velopment at all, it has sustained the highest average growth rate 
in  the world for year,  competes vigorously  in  world markets, 
seems unworried that most of its  new  technology is  imported. 
•  The United States itself,  during the period of its  most rapid 
growth in the last century, carried out virtually no original re-
search and development. 
Beyond that,  all  but the  most  arcane military-related  tech-
nology is  available to Western Europe in one way or another. 
In many fields not closely related to defense and space, Europe 
still holds a lead. European pure science, qualitatively at least, 
"Look at it one ll'ay  and the 'gap' gapes wide and clear. European1· 
watch  Americans walk about in  space  . . .  via  an  American-built-
and-launched Satellite."  Photo: Courtesy of NASA 
holds its own in  many areas, though the brain drain and other 
factors may call this into question in time. 
Europe's  so-called  negative  technological  balance  of  pay-
ments, drawn up by the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, which seeks to measure inflows and out-
flows  of technology, should spell  an advantage to Europe if it 
is mainly technology that is needed. Direct investments by U.S. 
companies do place advanced American technology at the serv-
ice of Europe. The charge that U.S.  firms  fob  off  obsolescent 
processes and products on Europe has a lot Jess to it than meets 
the eye if for no other reason than that American companies 
must compete with each other as well  as  with European firms 
in the European markets. 
"Technology Gap"-A Misnomer 
Clearly  less  effective  exploitation of technology,  not  a  lag  in 
technological  knowledge,  puts  Europe on  the  defensive.  The 
full spectrum of the innovational process and indeed the struc-
ture and motive power of European society are in  question. 
The technology gap has been called perhaps more accurately 
the "management gap." The aggressive  philosophy of Ameri-
can management, the inter-disciplinary management team con-
cept, the tight coordination between research, development and 
sales converge in  a driving force which more leisurely and indi-
vidualistic European management finds  hard to match. 
But  management  too  is  only  part of the  problem.  By  and 
large,  it  is  easier  in  the  U.S.  to  find  risk  capital to  back new 
science-based enterprises.  Many banks in  fast-growing Ameri- 19 20· 
can industrial centers like Boston and Washington train special-
ists  in spotting the new technological gimmick likely to  make 
money. These loan officers also specialize in  the unique prob-
lems  which  characteristically  beset  new  small  science  based 
ventures. 
In the new U.S. industrial communities (there are "technol-
ogy gaps" between the newer and older industrial centers of the 
U.S.  too)  an intimate association exists  between  business and 
the universities. And in  the U.S. as a whole, the continual cross-
fertilization of ideas and men among business, the universities, 
and government is  an obvious source of economic vitality. 
The quantity and quality of education clearly affects the inno-
vational process. Less than 10 percent of German young people 
graduate from high school compared to more than 70 percent 
in the United States. The University of Paris gave a degree to 
its first graduate in business management only a few years ago. 
There is more interchange of scholars and scholarship between 
European  and  American  universities  than  among  European 
centers of learning. 
The size of business enterprises is  important too. This is  not 
so true in the early stages of the innovational process, the small 
laboratory or garage-scale  enterprise  supplying  a  specialized 
product or process to a known and selected list of clients. 
However, size and fimincial  muscle become critical in bring-
ing new products to a mass market. The large diversified enter-
prise can also afford to gamble and Jose on a new process better 
than can a small specialized firm.  Only a handful of European 
firms can stand up to the growing host of American giants. And 
European firms  often prefer to  undertake joint ventures with 
financially and technologically rich American companies rather 
than with other European firms. 
Europe: Smallest Common Denominator 
The catalogue of "gaps" could be extended ad nauseam if  not 
ad infinitum. The remedies are as numerous. But they have one 
element in  common:  to  be  effective  they must be  applied for 
the most part on a Europe-wide scale. National palliatives may 
indeed aggravate the disease  by  creating new,  vested  interests 
unequal  to  the  challenge  of competition  in  the  new,  wider 
markets of Europe and the world. 
A European who has given much thought to the "technology 
gap" in its widest sense had this prescription for it at a recent 
conference on technology: 
"Abolish  the  Federal  Government  of  the  United  States. 
Divide the country into its  several states and make sure each 
has a wildly different system of taxation, a  different currency, 
different banking and insurance laws, different customs regula-
tions. Re-group American minorities into as many distinct lan-
guage areas  as  possible and in  any case  not less  than  15, and 
try to  make sure that whenever possible  there  is  at least one 
competing minority language requiring dual language schools. 
Oh yes, you will need 40 or 50 distinct patent systems. Do this 
and the technology gap between the U.S. and Europe will  fill 
up rapidly." 1 
Only the prescription  in  reverse-across-the-board  integra-
tion of the European economy on the  widest possible scale-
can really assure the degree of European economic independ-
ence necessary to permit Europe to be an effective partner of the 
U.S. Nothing illustrates the need more clearly than the French 
Government's admission of the impossibility of regulating for-
eign investment in France when the investor could settle across 
the border in the Saar and sell his  wares in France duty free. 
Perhaps the  most persuasive  argument for the radical  inte-
gration cure probably is  not technological  nor economic nor 
legal, but psychological. There is  much reason to suspect that 
only  such  a  fusion  process  is  likely  to  generate  the  political  , 
energy required to  carry out-and to  adapt to-the structural 
changes in the European economy which appear to be needed. 
Experience so  far with  joint European ventures  in  research 
and development strongly suggests the need for more far-reach-
ing integration.  Euratom, ELDO and ESRO~ have functioned on 
the whole quite well in  the research stage. But when they have 
gotten  to  development  they  have  tended  to  become  gravely  , 
bogged down in  national demands to  get as  much out of each 
project as each nation puts in.  CERN,:l on the other hand, has a  1 
solid record of success because its function is limited to research.  , 
Hard Choices Still Face Europe 
The organic nature of the so-called "technology gap" explains 
why the U.S.  role  in seeking to  narrow it  must perforce be a 
secondary one. The U.S.  Government can be of some help in 
making it easier for Europe to acquire advanced technology-
although even here  the  fact that most technology  is  privately 
owned  limits  Washington's  field  for  action.  American  com-
panies  operating  in  Europe  can  soothe  the  psychological  in-
flammation of the problem by  doing more advanced research 
in  Europe and  by  being discreet and selective  in  making new 
investments. 
Europe basically must cure itself. This is  underlined by the 
fact that U.S.  offers  to  cooperate in  outer space research and 
certain types of defense-related research have had few  takers. 
Most European firms  do not have the financial and human re-
sources for major undertakings in these fields. 
It is  proper and politically wise for the U.S.  Government to 
offer assistance. A strong self-reliant Western Europe certainly 
will bring more resources to  bear on common problems than a 
weak, fretfully dependent and divided one. In particular, as  the 
Fiat deal  shows  in  the  field  of economics and  the  diplomatic 
initiatives of de Gaulle, Wilson, and the new German Govern-
ment suggest in the political field, Western Europe has a crucial 
role  to  play  in  broadening  "peaceful  engagement"  between 
West and East. 
The hard choices and the heroic tasks  remain  Europe's re-
sponsibility-now as twenty years ago. 
(I)  Professor  M.  B.  G.  Casimir.  Director.  Research  laboratories  N.  Y. 
Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken,  at Gaithersburg Symposium  on Technology  and 
World Trade,  November  16-17,  1966. 
(2)  European  Atomic  Energy  Community,  European  Launcher  Development 
Organization,  European  Space  Research  Organization. 
(3)  European  Organization for  Nuclear  Research. The  European Parliament at 
the Crossroads 
by ELENA BUBBA 
A  sense  of  accomplishment,  vague  dissatisfaction,  and  deep 
,concern about  the  future  of the  Communities  permeates  the 
European Parliament this March on its  tenth birthday. 
The Treaties succinctly gave  it  ''powers of deliberation and 
1 control." The parliamentarians, all  members of their national 
legislatures,  had  no  doubt about  the  meaning of these  sparse 
i  guidelines in shaping the European Parliament. They copied and 
blended their  national  assemblies·  customs,  organization,  and 
functions which, luckily, are similar on the Continent. And so, 
I  the  142  parliamentarians  formed  four  political  parties:  the 
, Christian Democrats, today the largest, followed by the Social-
. ists,  the  Liberals,  and  the  European  Democratic  Union,  the 
smallest, which consists of 15 Gaullist delegates from the French 
, National Assembly. 
The  Parliament's  standing  committees  specialize  in  broad 
1 areas of Community activities, such  as  agriculture,  transport, 
I  budget,  and  so  on.  Now  there  are  12  committees,  but  their 
1 number fluctuates. According to European parliamentary prac-
' tice, the appropriate committee appoints a rapporteur to study 
every subject on which the European Parliament must take a 
stand. After hearing,  debating,  and  approving  his  report,  the 
committee then sends it with a draft resolution to the Parliament 
for discussion and adoption in plenary session. 
Imposing Accomplishments 
The parliamentarians' sense of accomplishment comes from the 
imposing mass of work they have done: 
Number of  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  Total 
Committee 
Reports  22  37  54  64  70  67  75  84  90  563 
Plenary  Sessions  18  40  40  31  31  28  34  30  29  281 
Committee 
Meetings  139  251  249  267  281  246  280  246  245  2,204 
By the end of 1966, the committees had finished 563 reports-
a  full  inventory without any omissions of every aspect of the 
three Communities' multi-faceted activities: 
Sul> ject 
Internal Economic Affairs 
Political, Institutional, and General  AtTairs 
Social  Matters 
Budgetary Matters 
Agriculture 
External Economic Relations 
Research and Culture 
European Parliament Lacks Power of "Control" 
Number 
123 
89 
89 
87 
86 
69 
20 
The European Parliament, although similar to the national par-
liaments in scope and organization, does not have the usual par-
liamentary  powers  but  then  the  Communities  themselves  are 
not comparable to a state. 
ln the first place, the Communities have no government. More 
specifically,  each  Community  has  two  executive  branches:  a 
Council of national Ministers which makes the most important 
decisions  now  and,  in  Community  language,  an  "Executive" 
which proposes decisions to the Council. The three "Executives'' 
-the ECSC High  Authority,  the  EEC Commission,  and  the 
Euratom Commission-are soon to be consolidated in  a single 
European Commission. 
What role can the European Parliament play in this new situ-
ation? In Europe, the national parliaments can elect  and oust 
their governments. Although the European Parliament can re-
move the three Community "Executives" from office by a mo-
tion of censure, it cannot elect them, and has no direct influence 
over the Councils of Ministers. Each Minister and his  govern-
ment answers directly to the national parliaments, an arrange-
ment which, while preserving democratic principles, provides no 
collective check on the Councils of Ministers. Each national par-
The European Parliament (first called "the European Parliamentary A.1semb/y") took over the work of the Com1110n Assembly of the Europ'ewr 
Coal and Steel Community which was rlissolved when the Rome Treaties came into force in 1958. This photograph was taken during the first ses-
sion of the new representative body on March 19-21, 1958. 
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Elena  Bubba,  Director  of  Parliamentary 
Documentation,  joined  the  Community  in 
1954, first working with the Common Assem-
bly  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Com-
munity,  then  with  the  European Parliament 
from  its  formation  in  1958.  From  1945-49, 
Madame Bubba, a lawyer and graduate of the 
University of Trieste, served as legal  adviser 
to the Allied Military Government of Trieste. 
liament  controls  the  actions  of a  single  Minister,  obliged  by 
the Treaty to  reach agreement  with  the other five  Ministers. 
Consequently,  national  parliamentary  control  is  necessarily 
fragmented. 
The national parliaments are empowered to approve, change, 
or reject legislative texts submitted to them. The European Par-
liament gives an opinion before the Council decides on Com-
munity "Executive" proposals, but can neither change nor veto 
a Council decision. 
Dissatisfaction Springs from  Limited Powers 
The limited powers of the European Parliament explain why its 
members are dissatisfied, although influence,  admittedly, does 
not depend solely on constitutional powers.  (The party system 
has made this question rather theoretical  at the national  level 
too.) 
The Parliament's influence is  strongest just before the Com-
munity "Executive" makes a proposal. At that time, the standing 
The new European Parliament building in Luxembourg contains the 
administrative offices of the  Parliament which  meets in  Strasbourg. 
committees work closely with the "Executive" tossing ideas back , 
and forth, and the directions emerge. Even if the European Par- , 
liament had the power to veto Council decisions, in few instances 
so  far (perhaps none)  would it have wielded it.  The frequent 
disagreements between the Parliament and the Council of Minis-
1 
ters mainly concern omissions:  decisions which have not been 
made, delays, crises.  I 
The increasingly technical nature of the problems of Euro-
pean integration is another source of the European Parliament's 
malaise.  Beneath  the  basic  regulations  fie  important political/ 
choices, but as the Communities grow, they offer more and more i 
details and less subject matter for great political debates. At the 
1 
same time, substantial changes in  the pattern of international 
relations directly affect the Communities but take place outside ' 
its sphere of influence.  i 
Questions about the Communities' future and impatience with 1 
the many technical debates together point to the growing need I 
for political debate.  1 
Were is the European Community going? Will it be enlarged  1 
by four or five  new members-Great Britain,  Ireland,  or the i 
Scandinavian countries? How will  doubling its membership af-
fect it? What should the Community do to ease relations with , 
the East? What role could it play in  reunifying Germany? Can , 
the political union-the extension of Community powers to for- , 
eign policy and defense-be expected to progress rapidly? How 
will the planned reform of NATO affect the Community? What 
role could the Community play in the Atlantic Alliance? 
The Treaties do not answer these questions.  Debates in the 
European Parliament must escape from a  frame of reference 
grown too  narrow. As  Europe looks  into  its  future,  the Euro-
pean  Parliament  must  tell  the  public  about  the  important ; 
choices it  must make. 
The democracies must learn that the world is now too 
small for the rigid concepts of national sovereignty 
that developed in a time when the nations were self-
sufficient and self-dependent for their own well-being 
and safety. None of them today can stand alone. No 
radical surrender of national sovereignty is required-
only a firm agreement that in disputes between nations 
a central and joint agency, after examination of the 
facts, shall decide the justice of the case by majority 
vote and thereafter shall have the power and the means 
to enforce its decision. This is a slight restriction 
indeed on nationalism and a small price to pay if 
thereby the peoples who stand for human liberty are 
better fitted to settle dissension within their own 
ranks or to meet attack from without. 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
From CRUSADE  IN  EUROPE.  by  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower.  Copyright  1948 
Doubleday  &  Company,  Inc.,  New  York.  Reprinted  by  permission  of  the 
publisher. Africa Transformed: 1957-67 
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HE  ROLE  OF  THE  YAOUNDE  CONVENTION 
by KAYE WHITEMAN 
HANA  ATTAINED  INDEPENDENCE  IN  MARCH  1957,  the  same 
month the Six, in Rome, signed the Treaty instituting the Euro-
ean Economic Community. Though apparently unrelated  to 
he Treaty, Ghanaian independence did affect it.  Appended to 
'he Treaty was the convention, the first associating the overseas 
ependencies of the Six-a score of territories  in  Africa  and 
nother dozen elsewhere-with the  Community. 
The birth of Ghana as  an independent state was the first of 
nany black Africa was to see in the next decade. Still considered 
symbolic  event in  African history,  Ghanaian independence 
cted as catalyst. By 1961, all of the Community countries' over-
eas territories in Africa, except three, had become independent. 
hartly, the Belgian trust territories followed suit and took the 
ames of Rwanda and Burundi. The third, French Somaliland, 
ill soon decide its own future. This was something the Rome 
reaty has not envisioned. 
rench Two-Pronged Initiative 
t has been alleged that France conditioned her participation in 
he EEC on the association of her overseas territories with the 
ix.  They constituted the  majority  of the  original  associates: 
ight French colonies in West Africa; four in Equatorial Africa; 
he two trust territories of Cameroon and Togo; and Madagascar 
nd French Somaliland. 
The French initiative resulted in the association convention 
ppended to the Rome Treaty and paralleled the enactment of 
he loi cadre of June 23, 1956, which brought new institutions 
nd rights of self-government to the French overseas territories. 
oth were part of the French post-war search for a formula to 
odernize its relationship with Africa. 
In fairly  rapid  succession,  France constructed  the  French 
bnion, the political institutions of the loi cadre. Soon after the 
~stablishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the French Com-
nunity took its present pattern of independent states. In 1957, 
France signed the association convention with the EEC without 
nentioning the powers of self-government which the loi cadre 
~ave the African territories. 
Leading French Africans, such as  Felix Houphouet-Boigny 
)f the Ivory Coast, were members of the French Government at 
he  time and approved the  move.  In the  Belgian  Congo and 
talian Somalia independence was  equally  unforeseen  at  that 
ime. 
lhe Race to Independence 
\.!most as the EEC was being born, a series of events forced the 
arly renegotiation of the whole Association. First of all, Guinea 
nswered "no" in the French referendum of 1958 on the Com-
rlUnity.  (Guinea was an associate under the Rome Treaty but 
er break with France apparently caused her association with 
1e Community to lapse automatically). Subsequently, France 
auctioned the independence of the MaliFederationwithin1the 
'rench  Community  and  granted  independence  to  the  Ivory 
~oast·outsidelthe·French ·community. Then suddenly, in 1960 
'le  Belgian Congo declared  independence. 
The convention was to be renewed at the end of 1962 but in 
961  the entire association arrangement looked dubious. When 
iscussions  began,  relations  between the  African  states  were 
uid  and  rapidly  evolving.  The  newly-independent  African 
ates  were  dividing  into  two  blocs,  the  "moderates" and  the 
Hardwoods and other exports at dockside, Douala, Cameroon, await 
lading on board the  French ship !rima. A  primary objective of the 
Yaounde  Convention  is  to  increase  the  associates'  trade  with  the 
Community. Photo: Courtesy AFRIQUE  PHOTO,  Paris 
pace-setting "radicals" led by Ghana and Guinea. 
Significantly, shortly after the Casablanca and Monrovia con-
ferences of African states had crystallized and christened their 
political divisions, in July 1961 the first inter-parliamentary con-
ference of members of the European Parliament and represent-
atives of the associated African legislatures met in Strasbourg. 
Likewise, in July 1963, just two months after the African blocs 
had merged into the Organization for African Unity in  Addis 
Ababa, the new convention between the African associates and 
the Six was signed in Yaounde. 
African Associates Drove a Hard Bargain 
The Strasbourg conference showed  that the Six  had accepted 
the necessity for a new type of agreement. Just as the European 
Parliament (composed of members of the six national parlia- 23 Kaye  Whiteman,  Deputy  Editor  of  West 
Africa for the past four years, was graduated 
from the Queen's College, Oxford. Mr. White-
man  was  formerly  a  journalist  with  Thom-
son  Newspapers. 
ments)  had debated the original Rome Treaty, so  a  new body 
which included representatives of the African states debated the 
new association convention. Although outsiders criticizeg asso-
ciation as a neo-colonial device to perpetuate European domina-
tion  and  the  division  of  Africa,  the  Strasbourg  Conference 
revealed  considerable  support  in  Africa  for  continuing  the 
relationship. 
The African states proved hard bargainers. At one point, the 
talks broke down for several months because they insisted that 
the European Development Fund provide greater resources, par-
ticularly to compensate the  former French territories for  the 
impending break-up of their special trade relations with France. 
There were other obstacles too, such as an African objection to 
being considered with  the  non-independent associates  (which 
now have a separate status). 
The Convention, finally approved by both sides on December 
20,  1962, met with  further  delay  when  French President  de 
Gaulle's veto of British membership engendered a crisis in  the 
European Community itself. Italy and the Netherlands threat-
ened to withhold ratification of the new convention in  protest 
at the exclusion of Britain. 
Representatives of the 18 African associates and the Six met 
in Yaounde, Cameroon in July 1963 and signed the new conven-
tion. It provided more than $620 million for European Develop-
ment Fund grants in Africa during five  years. The convention 
set a wider range of economic and social objectives, continued 
the tariff reductions between the EEC and the Eighteen,  and 
created institutions such as  the inter-parliamentary conference. 
It gave seats to all  18  associates and the Six on the Association 
Council. 
The Yaounde Convention "gave seats to all 18 associates and"the Six 
on the Association Council." Participants in  the May 1966 meeting 
of the Association Council in  Tananarive, Malagasy Republic. 
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During the negotiations,  the African associates had sought  ' 
representation in  the EEC's own institutions. Significantly, the  • 
Yaounde Convention gave  all member states  seats on  a  com-
mittee which influences the choice of projects and programs, to  1 
be  financed  through  the  EDF,  but  not  their  administration. 
(Not even the World Bank allows recipient states to participate 
in the administration of the aid they receive.) The Convention 
came into force on June 1, 1964. 
A Wider African Framework? 
Another psychologically important point was the declaration of 
the  Six  in  Yaounde  at  the  signing  ceremony,  invited  other 
countries,  with  economies  comparable  to  the  associates',  to 
accede  to  the  convention.  The  move  was  widely  taken  as  a 
suggestion  to  the  critics  of the  association  to  abandon  their 
inhibitions. 
In November 1963, after criticizing both the association and 
the British attempt to  join the EEC, Nigeria decided to apply 
for its  own association agreement with the European Commu-
nity, separate from the Yaounde Convention. After two and a 
half years of negotiations, an agreement was signed in  Lagos in 
1  uly 1966. Although limited to moderate trade concessions, the 
Nigerians had shown what could be done. The Lagos agreement 
is  to be renegotiated at the same time as the Yaounde Conven-
tion, before its expiration on May 31, 1969. However, Nigeria's 
present political difficulties may prevent ratification of the agree-
ment and its entry into force. 
Likewise,  the  inability of the  three  East  African Common-
wealth  countries  (Kenya,  Uganda,  Tanzania)  to  agree  on 
forming  a  common market of their own  has  hampere.d  their 
approach  to  the  EEC.  So  the  economic  division  of  Africa 
may remain almost by default. 
Preparing for Another New Stage 
The criticisms of the Association heard in  the early I 960's have 
now faded  as  Africa itself has  become less  disposed  to  histri-
onics. Jt  is  not  impossible that Ghana, once a leading critic of 
Association, might also,  like  Nigeria, negotiate an agreement. 
Attention has now focused on the associates, which have been 
making their presence felt in the association's institutions. When 
last October Hamani Diori, the President of Niger, questioned 
the value of the association in Brussels because the Community's 
trade with some non-associated tropical countries had increased 
more rapidly than it had with the Associates, the tables seemed 
turned with a vengeance. The associates vented their discontent 
at  the inter-parliamentary  meeting in  Abidjan last  December. 
Philippe Yace, President of the Ivory Coast National Assembly, 
stressed that consumption taxes hold back coffee consumption 
in  some EEC countries, to  the mutual detriment of European 
consumers and African producers. 
In clearing the ground for the renegotiation of the Yaounde 
Convention in 1968, the association's institutions will hear some 
tough talking, especially about the inequality between developed 
and developing countries. President of Senegal  Leopold Sedar 
Senghor, speaking on French television recently, called this the 
"problem of the century." But this criticism could also measure 
the vitality of the association and its central role in  the dialogue 
between Europe and Africa. Britain Rediscovers the Continent 
----------
by ROY PRYCE 
I  "IT IS  QUITE EVIDENT that the signing in Rome .. . means much 
more to  the  nations concerned  than it does  to  this  country." 
This view,  expressed  by  a  British  newspaper on  March  26th 
1957, was an  accurate assessment of the situation at the time. 
\One London daily, the now defunct News Chronicle, published 
1 a special supplement to  mark the occasion,  but otherwise the 
!
press was sparing in its coverage of the event. Editorial writers 
expressed many doubts about the future of the new Communi-
! ties. It was far from certain, they argued, that the French assem-
1 bly would approve the treaties; it was doubtful too whether the 
;GATT would approve of the Common Market. 
This mood of doubt was also tinged with apprehension. Some 
of the more well-informed commentators expressed fears about 
the looming difficulties for Britain of negotiating the Free Trade 
·Area by which the government of the day hoped to obtain access 
to the enlarged European market without having to pay the po-
litical price of membership in the Community itself. 
The Financial Times  said the British government had been 
assured that "the present treaty is  not going to be regarded as a 
final and unalterable document." But the British request-that 
the Six  postpone signature of the new  treaties  until  they had 
made certain that they would not create difficulties for the pro-
posed Free Trade Area-had been brushed aside. In fact there 
was considerable irritation in Britain that by including the Afri-
can association as part of the  EEC  treaty the Community had 
made such an arrangement perceptibly more difficult. The Man-
chester Guardian commented wryly: "If the Common Market, 
like the Coal and Steel Community, has to start its life by kicking 
England in the shins, we should be able to disregard the gesture 
as an old Continental custom." 
This was all ten years ago. At that time Britain was just begin-
ning to  recover from the indignity of the Suez crisis and from 
the political aftermath of the resignation of Sir Anthony Eden 
1s prime minister. Under his leadership the government had been 
notably cool towards involvement with the rest of Europe; his 
mccessor, Mr. Harold Macmillan, was still in  the throes of re-
;toring the fortunes of his party. As time went on he was to show 
himself a convinced European. 
But in the Spring of 1957 only a small minority in the country 
hought that full membership in the Community was desirable. 
When, in the wake of the Three Wise Men, some parliamentar-
.ans  began to  suggest  the  possibility of joining  Euratom, the 
Times gave prominence to an article by Lord Chandos strongly 
1ttacking the idea. '"The damage that would be done to British 
nterests by joining Euratom," he wrote, "would be permanent." 
>resent Courtship Rests  on Reciprocal Gains 
roday the situation has changed almost beyond recognition. Mr. 
Nilson,  though a recent convert, now declares that he  "means 
msiness" in seeking acceptable terms for membership. Several 
nembers of his cabinet, and in  particular Mr.  George Brown, 
tre known to be fervent advocates of membership and no more 
han three are opposed. 
The Conservative party, under Mr. Heath, strongly advocates 
·ntry; the great majority of industrial and business circles are 
·qually convinced; and opinion polls show some 70 percent of 
he general public in favor. Whatever doubts there still may be, 
•articularly on the other side of the Channel, about the extent 
and depth of the country's European convinctions there can be 
no  doubt  that  a  profound change  has  taken  place  in  British 
opinion and policy over the past decade. 
The major reasons  for  this  change are obvious enough.  In 
economic terms the advantages of belonging to a large market 
have gradually been accepted. As a recent report of the Confed-
eration of British Industry stated, membership in  an enlarged 
Community would offer "the best prospect of dynamic and prof-
itable growth for British industry in the future."  It is  acknowl-
edged that there  would  be  considerable short-term problems, 
but the long-term prospects, not just for Britain but for the whole 
European economy, are considered to depend on the creation of 
an  enlarged  common  market.  One  aspect  of  this  which  has 
recently been given much prominence, in Britain as in the rest of 
Europe, is what Mr. Wilson recently described in  his speech at 
Strasbourg  as  the  danger  of "industrial  helotry"-increasing 
dependence on American business. 
EEC Political Attractiveness Grows 
Although the majority of the general public in Britain still think 
of the Common Market primarily in economic terms, there can 
be no doubt that more sophisticated opinion has been much in-
fluenced by political considerations. 
Chief among these has been the gradual perception of Brit-
ain's loss of power and status on the world scene. Belief in  the 
Churchillian notion that the country's role depended on its rela-
In the past decade,  "the facts of the situation hm·e gradually pene· 
/rated the deep layers of indifference, suspicion and ignorance of the 
rest of  Europe, which have been inherited from se1·eral cenfllries of  de-
liberate IZOn-involvement." Photo: Courtesy of the British Travel  Association. 
New York (Copyright,  London) Roy  Pryce,  Director of the  Center for Con-
temporary  European  Studies,  University  of 
Sussex, received his Ph.D. in  1953  from Em-
manuel College, Cambridge. Mr. Pryce joined 
the  European  Community in  1957  as  Press 
Attache  for  the  London  delegation  of  the 
High  Authority  of the  European  Coal  and 
Steel Community, and in  1960, became chief 
of the  London office  of the  European Com-
munities Information Service. 
tionships with three circles of influence-the United States, the 
Commonwealth and Europe-has been steadily eroded. Public 
professions of faith in the existence of a "special re!'ationship" 
with the United States are still made from time to time, but be-
lief in it has been replaced by an acute awareness that it is  only 
special in the degree of dependence that it  now involves. Sim-
ilarly, few now believe that the Commonwealth can provide an 
effective means of influence, the interests of the various member 
countries being far too disparate. The conflict with Rhodesia, 
and the tensions it has produced, is only the latest of a long series 
of bitter lessons on the realities of the Commonwealth situation. 
Rebuffs Drove Home a New Reality 
Successive  British  governments  nevertheless  resisted  what  to 
many outside observers had long appeared to  be  the logic  ot 
these developments. For many years the most that was contem-
plated was some form of loose association with the rest of Eu-
rope.  This was the policy pursued with regard to the Coal and 
Steel Community, and the project for a Defence Community. 
The same idea gave birth to  the notion of a Free Trade Area. 
It required a succession of rebuffs to drive the Macmillan gov-
ernment towards membership in the EEC itself. 
The first blow was  administered late in 1958 when the Free 
Trade Area negotiations collapsed. Another followed with the 
collapse of the hopes that were entertained of "building a bridge" 
between  the  European  Free  Trade  Association  and  the  Six. 
Then, in  the spring of  1960,  Mr.  Macmillan was horrified  to 
discover in Washington the amount of support in  the U.S.  ad-
ministration for an acceleration of the Community's timetable. 
Shortly thereafter Whitehall began to think seriously about what 
up to then had been the unthinkable: entry into the Community. 
This was a decisive turning point, for if there were hesitations 
and reservations in the British posture during the abortive nego-
tations of 1961-63, the experience of grappling with the prob-
lems of entry led to a major evolution in British attitudes. Far 
more  support  for  membership  became  apparent  than  would 
have been thought likely a few  years earlier, and although Mr. 
Gaitskell's own hostility to Europe led the Labour party towards 
Members of the EEC and the Euratom Commissions entertained Brit-
ish  Prime  Minister  Harold  Wilson  and  Foreign  Secretary  George 
Brown at luncheon on February 1 during their visit to Brussels. Left 
to right: Mr. Wilson; EEC Commissioner Jean Rey; Pierre Chatenet, 
President of the Euratom Commission; Mr. Brown; Robert Marjo/in, 
vice-president  of  the  EEC  Commission;  and  Sicco  L.  Mansholt, 
1 •ice-president of the EEC Commission. 
outright opposition to entry, his attitude was not shared by the 1 
great majority of his closest political friends. 
Turnabout by labour  1 
Mr. Heath was right when, at the final gloomy meeting in  Brus-
1 
sels after the veto, he said that Britain would not turn her back 
1 
on the continent. There was certain)y a period of apparent in- ' 
activity,  but the  momentum of Britain's involvement with the ! 
Community  carried  on  just  beneath  the  surface  of  political . 
events. 
In fighting the election of 1964 the Labour party, which then 
came to power, gave no more than a noncommittal reference to 
Europe. In the spring of 1966, however, when he went to the 
polls,  Mr. Wilson found that he had to  reply to the Conserva-
tives' offensive on the  European front. He reacted angrily and 
in terms which suggested that he would not readily embark on 
the road back to Brussels. But it is precisely that road which he, 
in  turn, has now decided to take. Had he  wished to do so,  he 
could have left the preliminaries to  Mr.  George Brown and so 
guarded himself against the backlash of possible failure. But he 
has not chosen to do this.  On the contrary, he has committed 
himself personally to  the venture. Nor can there be  any doubt 
that he wishes to succeed. His emotional commitment to Europe 
may be  much less  apparent than was  the case  with Mr.  Mac-
millan, but calculations of national and personal interest have 
clearly impelled him in the same direction. 
Facts Gradually Alter Insularity 
In considering  this  evolution  in  British  policies  and  attitudes 
many, especially in the United States, may well  feel  that it  has 
been unduly protracted and timorous. So,  in many ways, it has. 
It has nevertheless been a fascinating process to observe as  the 
facts  of the  country's situation  have gradually penetrated the 
deep layers of indifference, suspicion and ignorance of the rest 
of Europe, which have been inherited from several centuries of 
deliberate non-involvement. 
No one has yet charted with any precision how the European 
idea has gradually taken hold of various groups in  Britain, of 
how a minority view  of a few years ago has now become the 
established doctrine of a majority. As  yet  we  know very little 
about  the  factors  which  pre-disposed  certain  individuals  and 
sections  of society to  take  a  favorable  view  of the  notion  of 
membership, and which in others have sustained hostility to it. 
What is  apparent, however,  is  that the issue  has cut across al-
most every  identifiable group:  social  classes,  political  parties, 
the civil service and professional organizations. Some very curi-
ous coalitions of interest have emerged. Left wing socialists have 
found themselves in the uneasy company of the right-wing Daily 
Express in opposing membership; while  the ranks of those in 
favor extend from  militant federalists  to  establishment  circles 
in the City and Whitehall. 
Today, however, it is very unfashionable to be against mem-
bership, even if there is no great optimism about the immediate 
prospects of entry. Nor is it likely that opinion will swing away 
again, for there is  no visible  alternative.  After so  agonizing  a 
reappraisal of the country's future, and its painful rediscovery 
of Europe, it is now more than ever true-as Jean Monnet once 
observed, Les Anglais restent candidats au Marche Commun 
c'est un fait. Signposts Towards European  Unity 
1947 June 5 
General  Marshall  proposes American aid to 
stimulate  recovery in  Europe. 
October 29 
Belgium,  Luxembourg,  and  the  Netherlands 
form the ·'Benelux" economic union. 
1948 April16 
The Convention for European Economic Co-
operation is signed, giving birth to the Organi-
zation  for  European  Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC). 
1950 May9 
Robert Schuman makes his  historic proposal 
to  place  French  and German coal  and steel 
under a common Authority. 
1951  April18 
The Treaty creating the  European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC)  is  signed  in  Paris. 
1952 August 10 
The  ECSC  High  Authority  starts  work  in 
Luxembourg,  under  its  first  president,  Jean 
Monnet. 
1957 March 25 
The Treaties creating the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) are signed  in 
Rome.  and  come  into  force  on  January  I. 
1958. 
1959 January 1 
The  Common  Market  makes  its  first  tariff 
reductions and quota enlargements. Euratom 
establishes  the  common  market  for  nuclear 
materials. 
1960 May 10-12 
EEC accelerates the time-table for establish-
ing  the  Common  Market. 
1961  July9 
Greece  signs  an  assocaatwn  agreement  with 
the  EEC in  Athens which  becomes  effective 
on November I. 1962. 
July 31 
The Republic of Ireland applies for member-
ship in  the EEC. 
August9 
Great Britain  requests  negotiations for  EEC 
membership. 
August10 
Denmark  requests  similar  negotiations. 
December12 
Austria and Sweden, both neutrals. apply for 
association  with  the  EEC. 
December15 
Switzerland. another neutral. applies for asso-
ciation  with  the  EEC. 
1962 January 14 
EEC  decides  on  the  basic  features  of  the 
common agricultural  policy. 
February9 
Spain  applies for association  with  the  EEC. 
April30 
Norway requests  negotiations  for  full  mem-
bership in  the  EEC. 
July 30 
The first  regulations under the common agri-
cultural policy take effect. 
1963 January 29 
French  objections  halt  negotiatiOns  with 
Britain for  Community membership. 
July 20 
Eighteen  independent  African  states  and 
Madagascar sign in Yaounde, Cameroor, the 
Convention  associating  them  with  the  EEC 
for five  years. It enters into force on June I. 
1964. 
September 12 
Turkey signs  association agreement  with  the 
Community  which  enters  into  force  on  De-
cember  I,  1964. 
1965 March 31 
EEC Commission proposes that as of July  I, 
1967,  all  Community countries  pay  all  levy 
proceeds  and  a  percentage of  their customs 
receipts into the Community budget and that 
the  powers  of  European  Parliament  be  in-
creased. 
April8 
The  Six  sign  the  Treaty  agreeing  to  merge 
the  Executives  of the  ECSC,  the  EEC,  and 
Euratom. 
July1 
The  Council  misses  the  agreed  deadline  for 
decision  on financing  the  common farm pol-
icy.  France boycotts  the  Community institu-
tions for seven months. 
1966 January 17 
The  Six  foreign  manasters  meet  in  Luxem-
bourg,  without  the  EEC  Commission,  and 
agree  to  resume full  Community activity. 
May11 
The EEC Council agrees to complete the cus-
toms by July l. 1968. Then, all tariffs on trade 
between  the member states will  be  removed, 
the  common  external  tariff  will  come  into 
effect,  and  the  common farm  policy  will  be 
completed. 
November10 
British  Prime  Minister  Harold  Wilson  an-
nounces plans for "a high level approach'' to 
the Six with the intention of joining the EEC. 
1967 February 8 
EEC Council  adopts  Community's  first  me-
dium-term economic program directives to in-
troduce a "value-added" tax system. 
March 25 
Tenth Anniversary of the signing of the Rome 
Treaties. 
June 5 
Twentieth Anniversary of General Marshall's 
commencement  address  at  Harvard. 
27 28 
Post-War Planning Linked Greec1 
EEC  AGREEMENTS  WITH  "MEDITERRANEAN TWO"  FIT  THEIR  DIFFERENT  NEEDS 
TURKEY, THE DOOR TO THE EAST, inherited the outermost sentry 
post of Western civilization from Greece in the post-war plan-
ning for the defense of Europe. Considering Greece and Tur-
key's strategic positions, the Western powers admitted them to 
membership in  NATO and the OEEC, the administrative arm 
in Europe of the Marshall Plan. 
A  decade  later,  close  trade  ties  had  developed  between 
Greece, Turkey, and  the members of the new European Eco-
nomic Community. In 1959 both Mediterranean countries re-
quested association with the Community, Greece in June, Tur-
key  in  July.  Greece, now  in  its  fifth  year of transition to  full 
customs union with the Community, and Turkey, in  its  fourth 
year of preparation for transition are still developing countries 
in comparison with the Six. 
The Mediterranean associates  have many similar economic 
and social problems. Heavily dependent on agricultural exports, 
both Greece and Turkey export large quantities of tobacco. To 
escape unemployment at home, many Greek and Turkish citi-
zens have taken jobs in labor-short Community countries. Both 
countries  are  running  balance-of-payments  deficits,  although 
their exports are steadily expanding. 
Though both are developing countries,  Greece and Turkey 
stand at different points on the economic scale; their agreements 
with the Community reflect their relative position. For Greece, 
the gradual  but difficult  transition  to full  customs union with 
the Community began the day the agreement came into force. 
For Turkey, the transitional stage will  not begin until Decem-
ber  1968,  after  five  years  of preparation,  if  the  Association 
Council decides that the Turkish economy is ready. 
During the first five years, Turkey receives Community prefer-
ences  for some of its  most  important exports,  but makes  no 
specific  concessions  for  Community products.  The  European 
Investment Bank will lend Turkey up to $175 million to finance 
development projects, compared with $125 million available to 
Greece during the first five  years of its agreement. 
Community imports from Greece have grown 79 per cent since 1961, 
compared with a 32.7 per cent increase in Greek exports to  the rest 
of the world, but the  Greek overall trade  balance has continued to 
deteriorate.  The  EEC-Greece  Inter-Parliamentary  Committee  ex-
pressed concern over this deterioration because consumer ROods im-
ports accounted for a large part of it. 
Commenting 011 the last report of the Greece-EEC Association Cowz· 
cit,  tlze  European Parliament's Association Committee pointed out 
that while the agreement had stimulated Greek trade  with  the Com-
munity, it had not yet helped to diversify Greek production. In 1961 
agricultural products comprised 64 per cent of the Community's im· 
ports from Greece, compared with 73 percent in /965. 
The European Investment Bank has approved $33.3 million ill loans 
for infra-structural investments, including the  highway construction 
considered essential for Greece to improve tourist receipts, one of the 
strongest positive factors in  its balance of payments. The Bank has 
approved $27.0 million to finance industrial projects. nd Turkey 
lecause export diversification would benefit the Turkish economy and 
·ssist the Government in  its efforts to  "westernize," it should not be 
ut off until the end of the preparatory period, the Turkey-EEC lnter-
'arlimentary Committee has recommended. Photo: Courtesy of the OECD 
'he Community must plan a coordinated policy for the entire 
fediterranean basin ....  The European Community is linked 
'it by association agreements with Greece and Turkey and by 
nnmercial agreements with Israel, Lebanon, and Iran. Nego-
1tions are in process with Spain and the Maghreb countries. 
ommunity policy, particularly the agricultural policy directly 
tects the whole Mediterranean basin. The preoccupation with 
udying all these problems in the same perspective, rather than 
the context of bilateral and individual agreements is. 
ere/ore, completely justified. 
M. C. SCARASCIA-MUGNOZZA 
rlement Europeen. Document 142, November 1966, page 22. 
The Turkey-EEC agreement has special political significance because 
it extends the Europe of the  Community to  the  edge of the Eastem 
world,  according  to  the  Association  Committee  of  the  Europea1z 
Parliament.  Photo: Courtesy of the OECD. 
The Turkish  population is  growing 3 per cent each  year.  Thus,  the 
Turkish Government expects unemployment to  persist  for  the  next 
decade even though economic expansion, projected at 7 per cent each 
year, will create more jobs.  To  reduce  unemployment and to  teach 
Turkish labor the skills needed for economic del'elopment, the  Turk-
ish  Government encourages  the  EEC countries to  expedite  the  re-
cruiting of Turkish workers, the first  Turkey-EEC Association Coun-
cil report indicated. 
29 30 
COMMUNITY DRAWS NEARER TO ECONOMIC UNITY 
EEC "Value Added" Tax System,  First Medium-Term Economic 
Program Approved 
The  European  Economic  Community  took 
another  step  towards  economic  union  last 
month when the Council of Ministers adopted 
the first  EEC medium-term economic policy 
program and a  common "value added" tax 
system. 
The  medium-term  program,  approved  on 
February  8,  sets  guidelines  for  economic 
growth  until  1970,  and  provides  for  closer 
co0~J.ination of the Six national policies. The 
program calls for greater efforts  to  promote 
science  and technology,  to establish incomes 
policies,  to plan national budgets for several 
years, and to encourage saving and industrial 
modernization  and expansion  to  continental 
size. It emphasizes the need for a Community 
attack  on  structural  problems  in  industries 
such  as  coal,  textiles,  and  shipbuilding  and 
for  a  Community program of industrial re-
development and  manpower training. 
Progress to Be Reviewed Annually 
The  medium-term  policy  committee,  com-
posed of representatives  of member govern-
ments,  will  review  the  program  annually  to 
see  whether  new  developments  indicate  a 
change of emphasis and to determine whether 
the governments actually do follow the guide-
lines.  The Committee may offer opinions to 
Community  institutions  or  to  the  member 
states.  Because  the  next  draft  medium-term 
program  will  treat scientific  and  technologi-
cal research and development, industrial and 
agricultural  re-organization,  capital  market 
development,  and other key  aspects  of eco-
nomic  policy  more  deeply,  the  committee 
plans to  concentrate its  work in these  areas. 
Erosion of "Tax Borders" to Begin 
The Council's decision on February 9 to begin 
harmonizing  taxes  under  a  common  sys-
tem of tax on the value added at each stage 
of manufacture marks another stage of prog-
NEXT FIVE YEARS 
OF EURATOM RESEARCH 
OUTLINED 
The  Commission  of  the  European  Atomic 
Energy  Community  (Euratom)  has  tabled 
before  the  Euratom Council  of  Ministers  a 
proposal  for  research  in  the next  five  years 
to speed the development of nuclear industry. 
The new lines of the research program, to 
begin  in  1968,  took  account of factors  such 
as:  Europe's  economic  growth  and  energy 
needs, the development of new nuclear indus-
try  techniques,  the  approaching  commercial 
applicability  of  certain  new  power  reactor 
designs,  world-wide  competition  in  nuclear 
industry,  and  Euratom's  own  nine  years  of 
experience in applied nuclear research. 
The  first  'Target  for  Euratom"  (the  so-
called "wise men's report") published in 1957 
proposed ten-year goals for Europe's nuclear 
power  development  which  have  turned  out 
to  be  far too conservative.  Today the  Com-
mission  considers  its  urgent  task  to  be  the 
setting of priorities for the most efficient use 
of funds  available to meet some of the pres-
ent challenges. 
The Commission's proposals for  Euratom 
activities  cover joint research,  dissemination 
of  information,  promotion  of  health  and 
safety  in  nuclear  industries,  technical  and 
mechanical  studies,  and  the  encouragement 
ress beyond customs union to economic union. 
By January 1,  1970, value-added taxes will 
replace the  "cascade" taxes now used in Bel-
gium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The pres-
ent  French  value-added  tax  will  be  aligned 
with  the  Community  system.  "Cascade"  or 
cumulative  taxes  are  assessed  on  the  total 
value of an article each time it changes hands, 
from  the  time  a  processor  purchases  raw 
materials  until  sale  of  the  finished  product 
to the retailer. 
The  fiscal  neutrality  resulting  from  the 
value-added tax will  benefit small businesses 
as  well  as  large integrated companies. "Cas-
cade"  taxes  encouraged  companies  to  inte-
grate vertically,  to  escape  multiple  taxation, 
and  discouraged  specialization.  The  value-
added  tax  system  will  make  it  economical 
for companies to specialize, an important con-
sideration especially for  service  and second-
ary manufacturing industries. The new system 
will  also  allow  exact calculation of taxes on 
intra-Community  trade.  Previously,  because 
these  taxes  had  to  be  estimated,  there  was 
a possibility of distorting competition. 
After the  introduction of the value-added 
tax system,  the  next step  towards  economic 
union will be to harmonize the rates. As tax 
differences  disappear,  so  will  the  need  for 
customs  formalities  at  the  borders  between 
member states,  tax refunds for exports,  and 
local taxation after customs entry. 
The  member  states  must  revise  their  tax 
laws before January 1,  1970 when the value-
added tax system comes into force.  The new 
tax will  be paid on all deliveries of merchan-
dise  and services in the  Community and on 
merchandise imports through the retail stage 
but during the  transitional period the mem-
ber states may, if they wish,  apply it only as 
far as  the wholesale  stage,  collecting a  sup-
plementary  tax on stages  beyond. 
of industrial uses  for  nuclear technology. In 
addition, the Commission proposed Euratom 
participation in national projects which could 
benefit the entire Community. Euratom could 
assist in .financing these projects and lend per-
sonnel,  services,  installation,  and equipment 
for them. 
The  joint  research  program  would  be 
financed by all members of Euratom and exe-
cuted at the joint research establishments. The 
program includes the construction of a pulsed 
reactor for use in conjunction with the  French 
Government's very high  flux  reactor  in  Gre-
noble  and  research in  the  direct  conversion 
of  nuclear  energy  into electricity. 
At  the  European  Transuranium  Institute 
at Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of Germany, 
the recycling of plutonium in thermal reactors 
and transuranium elements would be further 
developed. At the Central Nuclear Measure-
ments  Bureau  in  Gee!,  Belgium,  there  are 
plans for installing an accelerator and a mass-
separator. At the Petten reactor in Holland, 
further  work  would  be  done  on high  tem-
perature  gas  reactors  and  the  operation  of 
the  HFR materials-testing reactor. 
NOTICE. Contestants for the 1967 European 
Community prizes for doctoral theses on the 
legal, economic, and political aspects of Euro-
pean integration are reminded that the dead-
line for receipt of entries is April 1,  1967 (see 
European Community No. 100, page 15). 
FURTHER TARIFF REDUCTION 
ON FARM PRODUCTS 
PROPOSED 
The Commission of the European Economi' 
Community has proposed further tariff reduc· 
tions on the farm products subject to commor 
market organizations. 
Tariffs on some products would be cut b~ 
10  per cent  and  others  by  15  per  cent  01 
July  1. If the EEC Council of Ministers ap 
proves  the  proposed  directive,  tariffs  wouh 
stand  at 5  per cent  of their levels in  19 57 
The  Commission  plans  to  make  anothe 
proposal  before  July  1 to  eliminate interna 
agricultural duties completely by July 1,  1968 
the end of the transitional period to full cus 
toms union. 
f--------
$359.4 MILLION OF EDF 
AID FUNDS NOW PLEDGED 
Improved Procedures Speed Progr.an 
The second European Development Fund ha 
passed the midway mark with  $359.4 milliOJ 
of its  1964-69  resources  now  committed fo 
development  projects  in  the  countries  asso 
ciated  with  the  European  Economic  Com 
munity. 
Under the Yaounde Convention, the Fun< 
provides $730 million to finance developmen 
in  the  18  African and Malagasy  states asso 
ciated with the Community. (Of this amoun1 
contributed  directly  by  the  EEC  membe 
states according to set proportions, the Fun1 
holds $50 million in reserve to cover cost in 
creases and other unexpected expenses.)  Th 
EEC Council of Ministers' decision of Febru 
ary  25,  1964,  continuing  the  association  o 
the EEC member governments'  13  remainin. 
overseas  dependencies  with  the  Communi!) 
provides an additional $64 million to financ 
their economic development. Of its $744 mil 
lion free capital, the Fund has now committe' 
a total of $359.4, of which $21.7 for project 
in  the overseas dependencies. 
The first  EDF, established under the  195 
Convention associating all  of the EEC mem 
ber states' dependencies with the Communi[) 
provided  $581.3  million  to  facilitate  soci< 
change  and  to  assist  their  economic  growt 
from  1959  to June  1964.  The first  financin 
agreement,  which  covered  several  project: 
was  not  signed  until  April  1959.  Althoug 
the  EEC Council  of  Ministers  had  enacte 
the regulations governing EDF operations i 
December  1958,  the  funds  could  not  sta1 
flowing  to  the  associates  until  the  EDF ha 
established  liaison  with  them  through  th 
EEC member governments  then  responsibl 
for  conducting  their  international  relation: 
When  the  African  associates  attained  ind1 
pendence  (see  page  23),  the  Fund  had 1 
establish new direct channels of communic; 
tion with them. 
Thus, in  January  1960,  the  Fund had a] 
proved no more than 60 projects, with a pn 
visional commitment of $40 million. By Jan1 
ary 1962, as liaison between the Fund and tt 
beneficiaries  improved,  EDF  commitmen 
had  risen  to  $277  million,  for  233  projec 
chosen from 463  applications. 
Under  the  first  EDF,  almost  half of tl 
funds  were  spent  for  constructing  roac 
power  facilities,  and  other  infrastructur 
almost a quarter, for rural modernization; a1 
almost 9 per cent for health. Industrial pre 
ects absorbed 0.6  per cent of the  first  ED 
Emphasis Shifts to Rural Projects 
Of the  $359.4  committed  under  the  secOJ 
EDF, almost half will assist in the rural mo rnization  considered  essential  for  economic 
nd  social development. A third of the com-
litments  will  finance  investments  in  infra-
tructure, and a tenth, projects for educating 
nd training. Industrialization projects repre-
ent  1.2 per cent of the commitments. 
By contrast with the first  EDF, a speed-up 
,f  operations  in  the  field  has  enabled  the 
econd to commit almost half of its funds for 
he  five  year period during the first  two and 
half years. However, the actual expenditures 
till  Jag  behind  the  commitments. 
Contractors  must  prepare  and  submit 
!nders. The EDF, the EEC Commission and 
1e  associated  African  governments  con-
erned must approve the best offer. Then the 
ontractor  prepares  detailed  plans,  recruits 
torkers,  and  concludes  contracts  with  sup-
Hers  of  materials  and  equipment  before 
tarting work  on the project. 
As  a  result, during  1966,  the  Fund's total 
isbursements  for  commitments  under  both 
1e  first and second Fund amounted to $115 
1illion. In view of this time lag, for the next 
!Yen years the EEC members will be  paying 
n annual average aid of $150 million to the 
verseas  countries,  territories  and  depart-
tents associated with the Community. 
At  the  beginning  of  last  December,  the 
DF had paid salaries and consulting fees to 
:nd  155  technical  experts  to  the  associated 
ates. 
CSC COUNCIL AGREES 
>N JOINT COKING-COAL 
UBSIDIES 
o Relieve Pressure 
)n ECSC Industries 
he hard-pressed coal and steel industries in 
te  European  Community  will  have  relief. 
he  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  European 
oal  and  Steel  Community  has  approved  a 
igh Authority's plan for member countries 
, share the costs of subsidizing sales of Com-
mnity-mined  coal to the steel industry. 
The  Council's  decision  on  February  16 
1ded  a stalemate which began last July. By 
lowing the  steel industry to  buy its coking-
)a)  at world market prices, the decision will 
:lp to maintain sales of Community coal to 
: least one group of customers in a shrinking 
tarket. 
Community  coking-coal  has  met  increas-
tgly  stiff  competition  in  recent  years,  par-
~ularly from imports from the United States. 
bout  20  per  cent  of the  coking-coal  used 
1 the ECSC has come from the United States, 
1d  the remainder from Community sources. 
he  steel  mills  import  about  a  quarter  of 
teir coking-coal from other ECSC countries. 
1 the future, all member countries will share 
te costs of subsidizing this intra-Community 
1al  trade. 
ow the System Works 
1e  new  joint-financing  system  for  coking-
tal  will  operate  for  two  years,  starting on 
nuary 1,  1967. The Community steel indus-
'(  will  buy  coking-coal  at  about  the  same 
ice  it  would  pay  for  imports.  A  subsidy, 
eraging $1.70 per metric ton, with an upper 
nit  of $2.20,  will  make  up  the  difference 
tween t!Je  price of imports and the  higher 
ice of Community-mined coal. The member 
ttes  will pay these  subsidies directly to the 
al producers on the basis of their deliveries 
the steel industry. 
For coking-coal  and coke  exported to  an-
ler member state, the joint fund will finance 
per cent of the subsidies, up to $22 million. 
The  exporting  countries'  governments  will 
provide  the  remaining  40  per  cent.  Direct 
subsidies  will  amount to  $70  million. 
Germany and France will each pay 28  per 
cent of the  costs  of operating  the  common 
fund; Italy, 14 per cent; Belgium,  11  per cent; 
the  Netherlands,  10  per  cent;  and  Luxem-
bourg  9  per cent.  These  shares  reflect  each 
country's dependence on coking-coal imports 
as  well  as  the  relative economic  importance 
of their  steel  industries. 
Gradual Reduction in Coal Output 
ECSC High Authority President Dina Del Bo 
indicated that the High Authority was pleased 
with the results of the Council meeting, par-
ticularly because the ECSC Treaty provided 
no  mechanism of this  kind.  On  coal  policy, 
he  said,  the  member countries'  interests  di-
verge even more sharply than in agriculture. 
Although  by  1970  the  ECSC  expects  to 
reduce  annual  coal  output  to  between  185 
million  and  190  million  tons,  the  High  Au-
thority wants to prevent too rapid a cutback 
because of its adverse effects on coal  miners 
and coal mining areas. In 1966, coal produc-
tion fell more abruptly than at any time since 
1952  when  the  ECSC was  founded.  Despite 
the decrease  of 14  million tons,  6.5  per cent 
below  the  output  in  1965,  coal  stocks  rose 
to  nearly  34  million  tons,  as  consumption 
dropped by  15 million tons. In 1967, coal pro-
duction  is  expected  to  decline,  by 7  million 
tons, to 200 million tons, but the surplus will 
again grow by  13  million tons. 
In 1952,  when  ECSC output amounted to 
239 million tons, coal supplied 75  per cent of 
the  total  energy  consumed  annually  in  the 
six  ECSC countries. In  1966, it furnished 41 
per cent, and petroleum 48 per cent, of their 
energy needs.  By  contrast,  the  United States 
now  uses  coal  for  about  23  per  cent of its 
power, oil for about 40 per cent, and natural 
gas for nearly 34 per cent. 
EEC NIGERIA INTERIM 
COMMITTEE HOLDS 
FIRST MEETING 
The European Economic Community-Nigeria 
Interim Committee, created at the signing of l 
the association agreement on July 16 in Lagos, 
met for the first time on February 17. 
The  Committee,  in  charge  of  expediting 
the  rapid  implementation of the  agreement, 
expressed satisfaction that all signatories had 
initiated  the  procedures  for  the  ratification 
necessary  for  the  agreement  to  come  into 
force.  It was  agreed  that  Nigeria  and  the 
Community  would  soon  file  the  agreement 
with  the  General Agreement on Tariffs  and 
Trade in Geneva, as required by the GATT. 
At the request of the  Nigerian delegation, 
the  Community  outlined  the  procedures for 
distributing  and  managing  tariff  quotas  on 
the  four  Nigerian  products  excluded  from 
duty-free  entry-cocoa  beans,  peanut  and 
palm oil, and plywood. Preparatory to  defin-
ing "origin," the Committee began to  discuss 
the  "products originating  in"  clause  of  the 
i  agreement. 
year. Similarly, French steel output expanded 
by 6.4 per cent to  1.75  million tons.  In Bel-
gium, it rose 7 per cent to 790,000 tons, while 
in  Luxembourg  it  remained  unchanged  at 
370,000 tons. In the Federal Republic of Ger-
1  many,  monthly steel  output declined  by  1.5 
per cent  to  2.92  million  tons,  compared  to 
2.96  million  tons  in  1  anuary  1966.  In  the 
Netherlands, monthly steel output also fell , by 
6.5 per cent, to 270,000 tons. 
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FURTHER FREEING 
1  OF CAPITAL TRANSFERS 
PROPOSED 
The Commission of the European Economic 
Community has amended and resubmitted to 
the  Council  of  Ministers  its  proposal  for  a 
third directive to  improve capital mobility in 
the  Community. 
The  first  two  Council  directives  required 
the  six  Community countries  to  remove  ex-
change controls on capital transfers  between 
them.  The  third  proposed  directive,  as 
amended and  sent  to  the Council  on Febru-
ary  14, would eliminate other legal, adminis-
trative  and regulatory restrictions  on  capital 
movements. The EEC Commission explained 
that the  amendments are  intended  to  ensure 
reciprocity among the six  member countries. 
The third proposed directive would prohibit 
restrictions. based on nationality on the issue 
of foreign securities in  domestic capital mar-
kets  and  stock  exchanges  and on  the  acqui-
sition  of these  securities  by  financial  institu-
tions.  Up to specified ceilings, EEC countries 
still  maintaining  restrictions  would  be  re-
quired to  authorize local issues of other mem-
ber  countries'  securities  and  to  liberalize 
medium- and long-term financial credits. 
EEC  ASKS  U.S. 
TO PREVENT SAFETY CODE 
FROM HURTING 
AUTOMOBILE EXPORTS 
The Commission of the  European Economic 
Community has asked  the  U.S.  Government 
to prevent the new auto safety standards from 
hurting  European automotive exports to  the 
1  United States. 
The Commission said it  supported the Eu-
ropean auto manufacturers' complaint to the 
U.S. Traffic Safety Agency that because Euro-
pean car design and construction differs from 
the  American  manufacturers'  for  which  the 
standards  were  devised,  the  same  standards 
ought  not  to  apply  to  European autos. 
ECSC STEEL OUTPUT ROSE I 
8.2% IN JANUARY 
The Commission said that it supported the 
European  manufacturers'  efforts,  and  had 
asked  the  U.S.  Government  to  prevent  the 
application of the  safety standards from dis-
criminating against European automobile ex-
The  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community 
produced 7.35 million metric tons of steel in 
January,  an  8.2  per  cent  increase  over  the 
December 1966 production level. 
In January 1967, Italy produced 1.26 mil-
lion metric tons of steel, an increase of 13.2 
per cent over output in  the same month last 
ports to the United States. In 1966, the Com-
mission  noted,  manufacturers  in  the  EEC 
exported  more  than  600,000  vehicles  to  the 
United  States,  representing  about  a  third  of 
the EEC's total car exports, and  10  per cent 
i  of the  production  of some  European manu-
facturers.  31 e
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